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Abstract 
The US has experienced a sustained increase in productivity growth since the mid-1990s, particularly in sectors 
that intensively use information technologies (IT). This has not occurred in Europe. If the US “productivity 
miracle” is due to a natural advantage of being located in the US then we would not expect to see any evidence 
of it for US establishments located abroad. This paper shows in fact that US multinationals operating in the UK 
do have higher productivity than non-US multinationals in the UK, and this is primarily due to the higher 
productivity of their IT. Furthermore, establishments that are taken over by US multinationals increase the 
productivity of their IT, whereas observationally identical establishments taken over by non-US multinationals 
do not. One explanation for these patterns is that US firms are organized in a way that allows them to use new 
technologies more efficiently. A model of endogenously chosen organizational form and IT is developed to 
explain these new micro and macro findings. 
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“[The acceleration in US productivity] may be plausibly accounted for by a pickup in 
capital services per hour worked and by increases in organizational capital, the 
investments businesses make to reorganize and restructure themselves, in this instance in 
response to newly installed information technology” 
 
Economic Report of the President, (2006), p.26 
 
One of the most startling economic facts of the last decade has been the reversal in the long-
standing catch-up of Europe’s productivity level with the United States. American labor 
productivity growth slowed after the early 1970s Oil Shocks but accelerated sharply after 1995. 
Although European productivity growth experienced the same slowdown, it has not enjoyed the 
same rebound (see Figure 1). Decompositions of US productivity growth show that the great 
majority of this growth occurred in those sectors that either intensively use or produce IT 
(information technologies)1. Closer analysis has shown that European countries had a similar 
productivity acceleration as the US in IT producing sectors (such as semi-conductors and 
computers) but failed to achieve the spectacular levels of productivity growth in the sectors that 
used IT intensively (predominantly market service sectors, including retail, wholesale and 
financial services)2. Consistent with these trends, Figure 2 shows that IT intensity appears to be 
substantially higher in the US than Europe and this gap has widened over time. Given the common 
availability of IT throughout the world at broadly similar prices, it is a major puzzle why these IT 
related productivity effects have not been more widespread. 
                                                          
1  See, for example, Kevin Stiroh (2002). Dale Jorgenson (2001), Stephen Oliner and Daniel Sichel (2000). In the 
2002-2004 period Oliner and Sichel (2005) find that US productivity growth remained strong, but there was a more 
widespread increase in productivity growth across sectors. See Robert J. Gordon (2004) for a general discussion. 
2 Mary O’Mahony and Bart Van Ark (2003) decompose productivity growth for the same sectors in the US and 
Europe under common measurement assumptions. Compared to the 1990-1995 period, US productivity growth in 
sectors that intensively used IT accelerated by 3.5 percentage points between 1995 and 2001 (from 1.2% per annum to 
4.7% per annum). In Europe, productivity growth in these sectors showed no acceleration (it was 2% per annum pre 
and post 1995). Productivity growth accelerated in the IT producing sectors by similar amounts in the US (1.9 points) 
and Europe (1.6 points). In the other sectors there was no acceleration in either the US or Europe. 
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There are at least two broad classes of explanation3 of this puzzle. First, there may be some 
“natural advantage” to being located in the US, enabling firms to make better use of the 
opportunity that comes from rapidly falling IT prices. These natural advantages could be tougher 
product market competition, lower regulation, better access to risk capital, more educated or 
younger workers, larger market size, greater geographical space, or a host of other factors. A 
second class of explanations stresses that it is not the US environment per se that matters but 
rather the way that US firms are organized or managed that enables better exploitation of IT. 
 
These explanations are not mutually exclusive. In the final section of this paper we build a model 
that has elements of both (i.e. organizational practices in US-based firms are affected by the US 
regulatory environment and some of these practices are transplanted overseas through foreign 
affiliates of American multinationals). Nevertheless, one straightforward way to test whether the 
“US firm organization” hypothesis has any validity is to examine the IT performance of US owned 
organizations in a non-US environment. If US multinationals at least partially export their business 
models outside the US – and a walk into McDonald’s or Starbucks anywhere in Europe suggests 
that this is not an unreasonable assumption – then analyzing the IT performance of US 
multinational establishments in Europe should be informative. Finding a systematically better use 
of IT by American firms outside the US suggests that we should take the US firm organization 
model seriously. Such a test could not be performed easily only with data on plants located in the 
US because any findings of higher efficiency of plants owned by US multinationals might arise 
because of the advantage of operating on the multinational’s home turf (“home bias”). 
 
In this paper, we examine the productivity of IT in a large panel of establishments located in the 
UK, examining the differences in IT-related productivity between establishments owned by US 
multinationals, establishments owned by non-US multinationals and domestic establishments. The 
UK is a useful testing ground for at least two reasons. First, it experiences extensive foreign 
ownership with frequent ownership change. Second, the UK Census Bureau has collected panel 
data on IT expenditure and productivity in both manufacturing and services since the mid-1990s. 
                                                          
3 Another possibility is international differences in productivity measurement (Olivier Blanchard, 2004). This is 
possible, but the careful work of Mary O’Mahony and Bart Van Ark (2003) focusing on the same sectors in the US 
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Therefore, we have arguably constructed the richest micro-dataset on IT and productivity in the 
world. 
 
We report that the key fact in understanding productivity differences is the apparent ability of US 
multinationals to obtain higher productivity than non-US multinationals (and domestic UK 
establishments) from their IT capital. These findings are robust to a number of tests, including an 
examination of establishments before and after they are taken over by a US multinational versus a 
non-US multinational. Prior to takeover by a US firm the establishment’s IT performance is no 
different from that of other plants that are taken over by non-US firms. After takeover, the 
American establishment’s productivity of IT capital increases substantially (while the productivity 
of non-IT capital, labor, and materials does not).  
 
Overall, these findings suggest that the higher productivity of IT in the US has something to do 
with specific characteristics of US establishments, which we define as their “internal organization” 
(we discuss other possible explanations as well). We also show that US firms are organized 
differently to non-US firms and that they can change their organizational structure more quickly. 
 
Finally, we present a simple dynamic model that is consistent with the new micro and macro 
stylized facts. Based on our earlier discussion, we first assume complementarity between 
organization and IT. Then, tailoring our model to the comparison between US and European firms, 
we assume that in adjusting their organizations, otherwise identical firms face country-specific 
costs arguably related to differences in labor market regulations. Firms optimally choose their 
organizational form and factor inputs (including IT) in response to the acceleration in the fall of 
quality-adjusted IT prices post-1995. The higher adjustment costs for firms in Europe imply that 
they take longer to make the organizational changes, so during the transition US labor productivity 
and IT rise more quickly. Because multinationals find it costly to have different organization 
forms in their overseas plants, US firms in Europe will “transplant” their organizational practices, 
generating the results we see in our data. We also present some direct evidence supporting the 
model by using explicit indicators of institutions that could generate organizational inflexibility 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
and EU, using common adjustments for hedonic prices, software capitalization and demand conditions, still find a 
difference. 
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(i.e. measures of labor market regulation). Although there may be other theories that can 
rationalize the data, some of which we discuss in extensions of the model, we argue that this 
model provides a parsimonious framework for understanding recent productivity changes. 
 
Our paper is related to several other areas of the literature. First, there is a large literature on the 
impact of IT on productivity at the aggregate or industry-level.4 Second, there is growing evidence 
that the returns to IT are linked to the internal organization of firms. On the econometric side, Tim 
Bresnahan, Erik Brynjolfsson and Lorin Hitt (2002) and Eve Caroli and John Van Reenen (2001) 
find that internal organization and other complementary factors, such as human capital, are 
important in generating significant returns to IT. On the case study side, there is a large range of 
evidence5. For example, Larry Hunter et al (2000) describe how IT radically changed the 
organization of US banks in the late 1980s. The introduction of ATMs substantially reduced the 
need for tellers. At the same time, PCs and credit-scoring software allowed staff to be located on 
the bank floor and to directly sell customers mortgages, loans and insurance, replacing bank 
managers as the primary sales channel for these products. Along with the IT enabled ability of 
regional managers to remotely monitor branches, this led to a huge reduction in branch-level 
management and much greater decentralized decision-making for the front-line staff. This re-
organization of banks did not happen in much of Europe, however, until much later because of 
strong labor regulation and trade-union power.  Third, in a reversal of the Solow Paradox, the 
firm-level productivity literature describes returns to IT that are larger than one would expect 
under the standard growth accounting assumptions. Erik Brynjolfsson and Lorin Hitt (2003) argue 
that this is due to complementary investments in “organizational capital” that are reflected in the 
coefficients on IT capital.  Fourth, there is a literature on the superior establishment-level 
productivity of US multinationals versus non-US multinationals, both in the US (Mark Doms and 
Bradford Jensen, 1998) and in other countries, such as the UK (Chiara Criscuolo and Ralf Martin, 
2005). We suggest that the main reason for this difference is the way in which US multinationals 
use new technologies more effectively than other multinationals6. Finally, our paper is linked to 
                                                          
4 See, for example, Basu et al. (2003) or Stiroh (2004). 
5 Olivier Blanchard, Martin Bailey, Hans Gersbach, Monika Schnitzer and Jean Tirole (2002) discuss a large number 
of industry-specific examples. 
6 In a similar vein, John Haltiwanger Ron Jarmin and Torsten Shank (2003) suggest that differences in the productivity 
distribution of Germany and American plants could be due to greater experimentation in the US. 
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the literature on growth and regulation.7 One of the unintended consequences of labor market 
regulation in our model is that it slows down the ability of firm’s to re-organize. When faced by a 
radical technological shock (such as the big fall in IT prices), these adjustment costs can have 
serious consequences in terms of technological diffusion and productivity growth. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section I describes the empirical framework, Section II 
the data and Section III presents the main results. In Section IV we sketch a simple model that can 
account for the stylized facts we see in the data and Section V concludes. 
 
I. Empirical Modelling Strategy 
A. Basic Approach 
We assume that the basic production function can be written as follows  
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ititit cklmaq αααα ++++=                                                  (1) 
 
Q denotes gross output of establishment i in year t. A denotes (total factor) productivity, M denotes 
materials, L denotes labor, K denotes non-IT fixed capital and C denotes computer/IT capital. 
Lower case letters indicate that a variable is transformed into natural logarithms, so itit Qq ln≡ , 
etc. 
 
We are particularly interested in the role of IT capital and whether the impact of computers on 
productivity is systematically higher for the establishments belonging to US firms. With this in 
mind, consider parameterizing the output elasticities in equation (1) as:  
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where USAitD
 denotes that the establishment is owned by a US firm in year t and MNEitD  denotes that 
the establishment is owned by a non-US multinational enterprise (the base case is that the 
establishment belongs to a non-multinational domestic UK firm), the sub-script h denotes sector 
(e.g. industries that use IT intensively vs. all other sectors) and the super-script J indicates a 
                                                          
7 For example, Juan Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Andrei Schleifer (2004). 
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particular factor of production (M, L, K, C). We further assume that establishment-specific 
efficiency can be parameterized as: 
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where z are other observable factors influencing productivity - establishment age, region and 
whether the establishment is part of a multi-plant group. The ktξ  are industry-time specific shocks 
that we will control for with a full set of three-digit industry dummies8 interacted with a full set of 
time dummies. So, (combining equations (1) through (3)) the general form of the production 
function that we will estimate is: 
 
ithktithith
MNE
it
MNE
h
USA
it
USA
hi
JCKLM
J
it
MNE
it
MNEJ
h
JCKLM
J
it
USA
it
USAJ
h
JCKLM
J
it
J
hit
uzDDDa
xDxDxq
,
00
,,,
,
,,,
,
,,,
0,
' +++++++
++= ∑∑∑
∈∈∈
ξγδδδ
ααα
                     (4) 
 
where xM = m, etc. Note that the industry*time interactions ( ktξ ) control for output prices, demand 
and any other correlated industry specific shock. 
 
Although we will estimate equation (4) in some specifications, most of the interactions between 
factor inputs and ownership status are not significantly different from zero. One interaction that 
does stand out is between the US ownership dummy and IT capital: the coefficient on computer 
capital is significantly higher for US establishments than for other multinationals and/or domestic 
establishments. Consequently, our preferred specifications are usually of the form: 
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where the key hypotheses are whether 0, =USAitUSACh Dα  and/or MNEitMNEChUSAitUSACh DD ,, αα = . 
                                                          
8 We also experimented with year-specific four digit dummies and explicit measures of output prices (up to the five-
digit level) which generated very similar results to our baseline model with year-specific three-digit industry dummies. 
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(i.e. whether the output elasticity of IT is significantly greater for US establishments). 
 
B. Sub-sample of establishments who are taken over 
One concern with our strategy is that US firms may “cherry pick” the best UK establishments. In 
other words, it is not US multinational’s internal organization that helps improve the productivity 
of IT but rather the ability to recognize (and take over) UK establishments that are better at using 
IT capital. To tackle this issue, we focus on a sub-sample of UK establishments that have been 
taken over by another firm at some point in the sample period. We then estimate equation (5) 
before and after the takeover to investigate whether the IT coefficient changes if a US 
multinational versus a non-US multinational takes over a UK plant. We also investigate the 
dynamics of change: because organizational changes are costly, we should expect to see change 
taking place slowly over time (so we examine how the IT coefficients change one year after the 
takeover compared to two years later, and so on).  
 
The identification assumption here is not that establishments that are taken over are the same as 
establishments that are not taken over. We condition on a sample of establishments who are all 
taken over at some point in the sample period. We are effectively making two assumptions here. 
First, we assume that US multinationals are not systematically taking over plants that are more (or 
less) productive in their use of IT than non-US multinationals. We can empirically test this 
assumption by examining the characteristics (such as the IT level, IT growth and IT productivity) 
of establishments who will be taken over by US multinationals in the pre-takeover period (relative 
to non-US multinationals). We will show that there is no evidence of such selection9. Second, we 
are assuming that US multinationals are not systematically better than non-US multinationals at 
predicting (pre-takeover) the higher future productivity of IT for statistically identical British 
establishments. Although we regard this assumption as plausible it is not directly testable. If US 
managers did possess such foresight (and we will show that it is only for post-takeover IT 
                                                          
9 If US multinationals have higher IT productivity why do we not observe some systematic selection of US firms 
taking over particular UK establishments? In the model we sketch in section IV, for example, US firms would want to 
take over firms who were organized in a similar fashion to themselves (as indicated by their prey’s higher IT 
productivity). It is likely this incentive, however, is small compared to the many other causes of international merger 
and acquisition activity we observe in the data (which we confirm empirically in section III). Allowing for endogenous 
takeovers is an interesting area for future work. Identification of such a model of course requires some instrument 
which affects takeover probabilities without directly affecting productivity.  
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productivity that the US takeovers appear to be different than non-US multinational’s takeover), 
we cannot identify this separately from the more general superiority of American firms’ IT usage.  
 
C. Unobserved Heterogeneity 
In all specifications, we choose a general structure of the error term that allows for arbitrary 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation over time. But, there could still be establishment-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity. So, we also generally include a full set of establishment-level fixed 
effects (the “within-groups” estimator). The fixed-effects estimators are more rigorous, as there 
may be many unobservable omitted variables correlated with IT that generate an upwards bias for 
the coefficient on computer capital.  
 
D. Endogeneity of the Factor Inputs 
We also were concerned about the endogeneity of the factor inputs attributable to unobserved 
transitory shocks. We take several approaches to deal with this issue. We experiment with the 
“System GMM” estimator of Richard Blundell and Stephen Bond (1998) and with a version of the 
Steve Olley and Ariel Pakes (1996) estimator.  
 
II. Data 
Our dataset is a panel of establishments covering almost all sectors of the UK private sector, called 
the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). It is similar in structure and content to the US Longitudinal 
Research Database (LRD), which contains detailed information on revenues, investment, 
employment and material inputs. Unlike the US LRD though, the ABI can be matched to 
establishment-level IT expenditure data for several years and it also covers the non-manufacturing 
sector from the mid-1990s onwards. This is important, because the majority of the sectors that 
intensively use IT, such as retailing and wholesaling, are outside manufacturing. The dataset is 
unique in containing such a large sample of establishment-level longitudinal information on IT and 
productivity. A full description of the datasets appears in Appendix A.  
 
We build IT capital stocks from IT expenditure flows using the perpetual inventory method and 
following Dale Jorgenson (2001), sticking to US assumptions about depreciation rates and hedonic 
prices. Our dataset runs from 1995 through 2003, but there are many more observations in each 
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year after 1999. After cleaning, we are left with 21,746 observations with positive values for all 
the factor inputs. There are many small and medium-sized establishments in our sample10 - the 
median establishment employs 238 workers and the mean establishment employs 811. The 
sampling framework of the IT surveys means that our sample, on average, contains larger 
establishments than the UK economy as a whole. At rental prices, average IT capital is about 1% 
of gross output at the unweighted mean (1.5% if weighted by size) or 2.5% of value added. These 
estimates are similar to the UK economy-wide means in Susanto Basu et al (2003). 
 
We also considered several experiments by changing our assumptions concerning the construction 
of the IT capital stock. First, because there is uncertainty over the exact depreciation rate for IT 
capital, we experimented with a number of alternative values. Second, we do not know the initial 
IT capital stock for ongoing establishments the first time they enter the sample. Our baseline 
method is to impute the initial year’s IT stock using as a weight the establishment’s observed IT 
investment relative to the industry IT investment. An alternative is to assume that the plant’s share 
of the industry IT stock is the same as its share of employment in the industry. Finally, we use an 
entirely different measure of IT use based on the number of workers in the establishment who use 
computers (taken from a different survey). Qualitatively similar results were obtained from all 
methods. 
 
We have large numbers of multinational establishments in the sample. About 8% of the 
establishments are US owned, 31% are owned by non-US multinationals and 61% are purely 
domestic. Multinationals’ share of employment is even higher and their share of output higher still. 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the different types of ownership, all relative to the 
three-digit industry average for a typical year (2001). Labor productivity, as measured by output 
per employee, is 24% higher for US multinational establishments and 15% higher for non-US 
multinational establishments. This suggests a nine percentage point productivity premium for US 
establishments as compared to other multinationals.11 But US establishments also look 
systematically larger and more intensive in their non-labor input usage than other multinationals. 
                                                          
10 Table A2 sets out the basic summary statistics of the sample. 
11  This is consistent with evidence that the plants of multinational US firms are more productive both on US soil 
(Mark Doms and Bradford Jensen, 1998) and on foreign soil (Chiara Criscuolo and Ralf Martin (2004)). 
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US establishments have 14 percentage points more employees and use about 8 percentage points 
more materials/intermediate inputs per employee and 10 percentage points more non-IT capital per 
employee than other multinationals. Most interesting for our purposes, though, the largest gap in 
factor intensity is for IT: US establishments are 32 percentage points more IT intensive than other 
multinationals. Hence, establishments owned by US multinationals are notably more IT-intensive 
than other multinationals in the same industry; this alone could be the reason for their higher 
productivity in previous studies (as they have not been able to control for IT capital). In the 
econometric analysis, we will show that this is not the full story because for a given amount of IT 
capital US productivity appears to be higher. 
 
III. Results 
A. Main Results  
One key result in our paper is that US establishments’ IT use is associated with greater 
productivity than non-US establishments’ IT use. Some indication of this can be seen in the raw 
data. In the first row of Table 2 we show that the mean value added per worker (normalized by the 
industry average) in establishments with high IT intensity (defined as above the sample median IT 
capital per worker) compared to those with lower IT intensity (below the sample median) is 34% 
higher among the US owned establishments. In the second row, we show that the equivalent “IT 
premium” is only 24% for establishments owned by non-US multinationals. The implied 
“difference in differences” effect is a significant US premium in IT productivity of 10%. There are 
a host of reasons why this comparison might be misleading, of course, but as we investigate them 
below it will become clear that the basic contrast in Table 2 turns out to be remarkably robust. 
 
In Table 3 we examine the output elasticity of IT in the standard production function framework 
described in Section II. Column (1) estimates the basic production function, including dummy 
variables for whether or not the plant is owned by a US multinational (“USA”)  or a non-US 
multinational (“MNE”) with domestic establishments being the omitted base. US establishments 
are 7.1% more productive than UK domestic establishments and non-US multinationals are 3.9% 
more productive. This 3.2% difference between the US and non-US multinationals coefficients is 
also significant at the 5% level (p-value =0.02) as shown at the base of the column. This implies 
that about two-thirds (6 percentage points of the 9 percentage point gap) of the labor productivity 
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gap between US and other multinationals shown in Table 1 can be accounted for by our 
observables, such as greater non-IT factor intensity in the US establishments, but a significant gap 
remains. 
 
The second column of Table 3 includes the IT capital measure. This enters positively and 
significantly and reduces the coefficients on the ownership dummies. US establishments are more 
IT intensive than other establishments; this explains some of the productivity gap. But it only 
accounts for about 0.2 percentage points of the initial 3.2% (= 0.0712 - 0.0392) productivity gap 
between US and non-US establishments. Column (3) includes two interaction terms: one between 
IT capital and the US multinational dummy and the other between IT capital and the non-US 
multinational dummy. These turn out to be very revealing. The interaction between the US dummy 
and IT capital is positive and significant at conventional levels. According to column (3) doubling 
the IT stock is associated with an increase in productivity of 5.35% (= 0.0449 + 0.0086) for a US 
multinational but only 4.5% (= 0.0449 + 0.0001) for a non-US multinational. Note that non-US 
multinationals are not significantly different from domestic UK establishments in this respect: we 
cannot reject the possibility that the coefficients on IT are equal for domestic UK establishments 
and non-US multinationals. It is the US establishments that are distinctly different. Furthermore, 
the linear US dummy is not significantly different from zero. Interpreted literally, this means that 
we can “account” for all of the US multinational advantage by their more effective use of IT. 
Hypothetically, US establishments with less than about £1,000 (about $2,000) of IT capital (i.e. 
ln(C) = 0) are no more productive than their UK counterparts (none of the US establishments in 
the sample have IT spending this low, of course). 
 
To investigate the industries that appear to account for the majority of the productivity acceleration 
in the US we split the sample into “high IT using intensive sectors” in column (4) and “Other 
sectors” in column (5). Sectors that use IT intensively account for most of the US productivity 
growth between 1995 and 2003. These include retail, wholesale and printing/publishing12. The US 
interaction with IT capital is much stronger in the IT intensive sectors, in that it is not significantly 
                                                          
12 See Appendix Table A1 for a full list. We follow the same definitions of the sectors that intensively use IT as Kevin 
Stiroh (2002). We group the IT producing sectors (like semi-conductors) with the “Other Sectors” because we could 
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different from zero in the other sectors (even though we have twice as many observations in those 
industries). The final three columns include a full set of establishment fixed effects. The earlier 
pattern of results is repeated with a higher value of the interaction than in the non-fixed effects 
results. In particular, column (7) demonstrates that US establishments appear to have significantly 
higher productivity of their IT capital stocks than domestic establishments or other multinationals. 
A doubling of the IT capital stock is associated with 1% higher productivity for a domestic 
establishment and 1.6% for a non-US multinational, but 3.9% higher productivity for an 
establishment owned by a US multinational13.  
 
The reported US*IT interaction tests for significant differences in the output-IT elasticity between 
US multinationals and UK domestic establishments. However, note that in our key specifications 
the IT coefficient for US multinationals is significantly different from the IT coefficient for other 
multinationals. The row at the bottom of Table 3 reports the p-value of tests on the equality 
between the US*IT and the MNE*IT coefficient (i.e. Ho: MNEit
MNEC
h
USA
it
USAC
h DD
,, αα = ).  
 
B. Robustness Tests  
Table 4 presents a series of tests showing the robustness of the main results - we focus on the fixed 
effects specification, which is the most demanding, and on the IT intensive sectors, which we have 
shown to be crucial in driving our result. The first column represents our baseline production 
function results from column (7) in Table 3. The results were similar if we use value-added-based 
specifications (see column (2)), so we stay with the more general specification using gross output 
as the dependent variable. 
 
Transfer Pricing - Since we are using multinational data, could transfer pricing be a reason for the 
results we obtain? If US firms shifted more of their accounting profits to the UK than other 
multinationals this could cause us to over-estimate their productivity. But this would suggest that 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
not find significant differences in the IT coefficient between US and non-US firms. This is consistent with the 
aggregate evidence that the productivity acceleration in these sectors was similar in Europe and the US. 
13 The linear US dummy is negative and significant, implying that US multinationals with very low IT stocks are less 
productive than domestic establishments. However, using the estimates of column (4) only 2% of the employees of US 
multinationals are in these plants (5% using column (7)). Moreover, we show that when US firms take over an 
establishment’s productivity can remain low for a year or two during the restructuring process, explaining the negative 
direct US dummy given the short time dimension of the sample. 
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the factor coefficients on other inputs, particularly on materials, also would be systematically 
different for US establishments. To test this, column (3) estimates the production function with a 
full set of interactions between the US multinational dummy and all the factor inputs (and the non-
US multinational dummy and all the factor inputs). None of the additional non-IT factor input 
interactions are individually significant, and the joint test at the bottom of the column of the 
additional interactions shows that they are jointly insignificant (for example, the joint test of the all 
the US interactions except the IT interaction has a p-value of 0.48). We cannot reject the 
specification of equation (5) in column (1) as a good representation of the data versus the more 
general interactive models of equation (4) in column (3).14 This experiment also rejects the general 
idea that the productivity advantage of the US is attributable to differential mark-ups, because then 
we would expect to see significantly different coefficients on all the factor inputs, not just on the 
IT variable (Tor Klette and Zvi Griliches, 1996). 
 
Another piece of evidence against the transfer pricing story is that our results are strongest in the 
IT-using sectors, which are mainly services, like retail. Manipulating the transfer prices of 
intermediate inputs is more difficult in services than manufacturing, as intermediate inputs 
generally are purchased from independent suppliers. If we estimate the model solely for the retail 
sector, for example, the coefficient on the US*IT interaction is 0.0509 with a standard error of 
0.0118 (the interaction of other multinationals with IT has a coefficient of -0.0142 with a standard 
error of 0.0096). 
 
Systematic mismeasurement of American establishments’ IT capital stock - One concern is that we 
may be underestimating the true IT stock of US multinationals in the initial year: this could 
generate a positive coefficient on the interaction term, because of greater measurement error of IT 
capital for the US establishments. This also could be due to transfer price concerns, causing the US 
firms to underestimate their IT expenditure for some reason.  
 
                                                          
14 The p-value = 0.33 on this test. We also investigated whether the coefficients in the production function regressions 
differ by ownership type and sector (IT intensive or not). Running the six separate regressions (three ownership types 
by two sectors) we found the F-test rejected at the 1% level the pooling of the US multinationals with the other firms 
in the IT intensive sectors. In the non-IT intensive sectors, by contrast, the pooling restrictions were not rejected. 
Details from the authors on request. 
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To tackle this issue we turn to an alternative IT survey (the E-commerce Survey, described in the 
Appendix) that has data on the proportion of workers in the establishment who are using 
computers. This is a pure “stock” measure so it is unaffected by the initial conditions concern15. In 
Column (4) we replace our IT capital stock measure with a measure of the number of workers 
using computers. Reassuringly, we still find a positive and significant coefficient on the US 
interaction with computer usage.  
 
Functional Forms - We tried including a much broader set of interactions and higher order terms 
(a “translog” specification) but these were generally individually insignificant. Column (5) shows 
the results of including all the pair-wise interactions of materials, labor, IT capital, and non-IT 
capital and the square of each of these factors. The additional terms are jointly significant but the 
key US interaction with the IT term remains basically unchanged (it falls slightly from 0.0278 to 
0.0268) and remains significant.  
 
Selection of US establishments into sectors with high IT productivity - Another possible 
explanation for the apparently higher productivity of IT is that US multinationals may be 
disproportionately represented in specific industries in which the output elasticity of IT is 
particularly high. The interaction of IT capital with the US dummy then would capture omitted 
industry characteristics rather than a “true” effect linked to US ownership. To test for this potential 
bias, we include in our regression as an additional control the percentage of US multinationals in 
the specific four-digit industry (“USA_IND”)16 and its interaction with IT. The interaction was 
positive but statistically insignificant (see column (6)), and the coefficient on the IT*US 
interaction remains significant and largely unchanged.  
 
Skills - In column (7), we considered the role of skills. Our main control for labor quality in Table 
3 was the inclusion of establishment-specific fixed effects which, so long as labor quality does not 
change too much over time, should control for the omitted human capital variable. As an 
alternative, we assume that wages reflect marginal products of workers, so that conditioning on the 
                                                          
15 Our IT capital stock measure is theoretically more appropriate as it is built analogously to the non-IT stock and is 
comparable to best practice existing work. The E-Commerce Survey is available for three years (2001 to 2003), but 
the vast majority of the sample is observed only for one period, so we do not control for fixed effects. 
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average wage in the establishment is sufficient to control for human capital17. The average wage is 
highly significant and the interaction between the average wage and IT capital is positive and 
significant at the 10% level, consistent with technology-skill complementarity. The interaction 
between the US dummy and average wages in the establishment is insignificant (a coefficient of 
0.0365 and a standard error of 0.0403)18. Nevertheless, even in the presence of these skills 
controls, the coefficient on the US ownership and IT interaction remains significantly positive. 
 
Stronger selection effects for US multinationals because of greater distance from the UK - A 
further issue is that US firms may be more productive in the UK because the US is geographically 
further away than the average non-US multinational’s home base (in our data most foreign 
multinationals are European if they are not American) and only the most productive firms are able 
to overcome the fixed costs of distance. To test this we divide the non-US multinational dummy 
into European versus non-European firms. Under the distance argument, the non-European firms 
would have to be more productive to be able to set up greenfield establishments in the UK. 
According to column (8) though, the European and non-European multinationals are statistically 
indistinguishable from each other; again, it is the US multinationals that appear to be different. 
 
Unmeasured software inputs for US establishments - Could the US*IT interaction effect reflect 
greater unmeasured software inputs for US establishments? Although this is certainly possible 
when we compare US multinationals with domestic establishments it is less likely when we 
compare US multinationals with non-US multinationals because a priori there is no reason to 
believe that they have higher levels of software. It could, however, be a problem if US firms were 
globally larger than other multinationals (software has a large fixed cost component so will be 
cheaper per unit for larger firms than smaller firms). To address this issue, we included a measure 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
16 The variable is constructed as an average between 1995 and 2003 and is built using the whole ABI population. 
17 The problem is that wages may control for “too much”, as some proportion of wages may be related to non-human 
capital variables. For example, in many bargaining models, firms with high productivity will reward even 
homogenous workers with higher wages (for example, see John Van Reenen, 1996, on sharing the quasi-rents from 
new technologies). 
18 As an alternative we matched in education information by aggregating up individual level survey (the Labor Force 
Survey) into industry by regional cells. In the specifications without fixed effects, there was some evidence for a 
positive and significant interaction between skills and IT consistent with complementarity between technology and 
human capital. The US*IT capital interaction remained significant. Including fixed effects, however, renders the skills 
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of the “global size” of the multinational parent of our establishments. In our UK ABI data, US 
multinationals and non-US multinationals are similar in their median global employment size. As a 
more direct test, we introduce an explicit interaction term between the global size of the parent 
firm (defined as the log of the total number of worldwide employees) and IT capital in a 
specification identical to baseline specification in column (1) of Table 4. The interaction between 
global size and IT is insignificant and the US interaction with IT remained significant (at the 1% 
level) and significantly different from the non-US multinational interaction with IT at the 10% 
level19. 
 
We also used a measure of software capital constructed analogously to our main IT capital 
variable (see Appendix A). In our data, software expenditure includes a charge for software 
acquired from the multinational’s parent. The IT capital interaction is robust to the inclusion of 
this measure of software capital (and its interaction with ownership status). For example, when we 
added software capital to a specification identical to column (1) of Table 4 the standard IT 
interaction with the US remained positive and significant20.  
 
So the evidence does not appear to support a large role for unmeasured software inputs driving the 
superior US productivity of IT. But even if this did play some role, it would still leave the puzzle 
of why US firms have so much higher software inputs than other multinationals. Commercial 
software is available globally and is costless to transport. One could argue that US firms have 
access to a better pool of computer programmers, for example from Silicon Valley, and these 
develop more advanced in-house software.21 But even if this were true, market forces would 
rapidly provide this commercially if it had such a large positive effect on productivity. The model 
presented below in section IV offers one explanation of why the US may have “moved first” in 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
variables and their interactions insignificant (even though US*IT interaction remains significant). Interactions between 
the US dummy and skills were insignificant in all specifications. 
19 The global size variable was only available for a sub-sample of 3,000 observations (from the baseline sample of 
7,784). When we re-ran the baseline specification on this smaller sub-sample, the US interaction with IT was 0.032 
(instead of 0.028 in the baseline) and significant at the 5% level. When we include the global size term the point 
estimate rose to 0.036 (the point estimate on the global size interaction was -0.0017). We are very grateful to Ralf 
Martin and Chiara Criscuolo for matching in the data.  
20 The IT hardware capital interaction had a coefficient of 0.0263 with a standard error of 0.0118. 
21 There is, of course, a highly successful European software industry, including firms like SAP that provides global 
enterprise application software. 
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organizational change based on lower labor market regulations: it is less clear why this should 
have been the case for software. 
 
Controlling for endogenous inputs – We also estimated the production functions to control for the 
endogeneity of factor inputs using the GMM “System” estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) and 
the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimator. The full results are shown in Appendix Table A3. In both 
cases the main finding - that the output-elasticity of IT for US multinationals is much larger than 
the output-elasticity of IT for non-US multinationals - is robust, even though the coefficients are 
estimated less precisely than under our baseline within-groups estimates.22  
 
C. US Multinational Takeovers of UK establishments 
One possible explanation for our results is that US firms “cherry pick” the best UK establishments, 
that is, those that already have the highest productivity of IT. This would generate the positive 
interaction we find but it would be due entirely to selection on unobserved heterogeneity rather 
than to higher IT productivity caused by US ownership. To look at this issue, we examined the 
sub-sample of establishments that were, at some point in our sample period, taken over by another 
firm. We considered both US and non-US acquirers. Because of the high rate of merger and 
acquisition activity in the UK, this is a large sample (4,888 observations)23.  
  
In column (1) of Table 5, we start by estimating our standard production functions, for all 
establishments that are eventually taken over in their pre-takeover years (this is labelled “before 
takeover”). The coefficients on the observable factor inputs are very similar to those for the whole 
sample in column (2) of Table 3. Unlike the full sample, though, the US and non-US ownership 
dummies are insignificant, suggesting that the establishments taken over by multinationals are not 
ex ante more productive than those acquired by domestic UK firms. 
 
                                                          
22 The coefficient on the US*IT interaction in the GMM system estimator is 0.118 with a standard error of 0.064  and 
this is significantly different from the non-US multinational interaction at the 10% level. The underlying theoretical 
model of Olley-Pakes does not allow us to simply include interactions, so we estimated the production function 
separately for the three ownership types (US multinationals, non-US multinationals and domestic UK establishments). 
The output-IT elasticity for US multinationals is twice as large as that of non-US multinationals. 
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In column (2) of Table 5 we interact the IT capital stock with a US and a non-US multinational 
ownership dummy, again estimated on the pre-takeover data. We see that neither interaction is 
significant – that is before establishments are taken over by US firms they do not have unusually 
high IT coefficients. So, US firms also do not appear to be selecting establishments that already 
provide higher IT productivity. In columns (3) and (4) we estimate production function 
specifications identical to columns (1) and (2) but on the post-takeover sample. In column (3), the 
non-US and US multinational ownership coefficients are positive and significant. Thus, a transfer 
of ownership from domestic to multinational production is associated with an increase in 
productivity, particularly for a move to US ownership.   
 
Column (4) is the key result for Table 5. It contains the estimates of a specification that allows the 
IT capital stock coefficient to vary by ownership status for the post-takeover sample. For the post-
takeover period we indeed see that the interaction between IT and the US dummy is positive and 
significant at the 5% level but is insignificant for non-US multinationals. Hence, after a takeover 
by a US multinational, an establishment enjoys significantly higher IT-related productivity than a 
statistically similar establishment taken over by a non-US multinational. Note that the inclusion of 
the US interaction with IT also drives the coefficient on the linear US multinational term into 
insignificance, suggesting that the main reason for the improved performance of establishments 
after a US takeover is linked to the increased IT productivity (just as we saw in Table 3 for the 
whole sample). The fifth column of Table 5 breaks down the post takeover period into the first 
year after the takeover and the subsequent years (note that throughout the table we drop the 
takeover year itself as we cannot determine the exact timing within the year when the takeover 
occurred). The greater productivity of IT capital in establishments taken over by US multinationals 
is revealed only two and three years after takeover (this interaction is significant at the 5% level 
whereas the interaction in the first year is insignificant). This is consistent with the idea that US 
firms take some time to restructure before obtaining higher productivity gains from IT. Domestic 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
23 We have a larger number of observations “post-takeover” than “pre-takeover” as there was a takeover wave at the 
beginning of our sample in the late 1990s associated with the stock market bubble and high tech boom. For these 
establishments, we necessarily have a lot more post takeover information than pre-takeover information. 
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and other multinationals again reveal no pattern, with all dummies and interactions remaining 
insignificant.24 
 
The sample in Table 5 includes some firms that are taken over by domestic UK firms, so a 
stronger test is to drop these and consider only takeovers by multinational firms. In column (6) we 
replicate the specification of column (5) for this smaller sample and again find that establishments 
taken over by US multinationals have a significantly higher coefficient on IT capital after two or 
more years than non-multinational takeovers. 
 
As another cut on the cherry-picking concept we ran linear probability models of US takeovers 
where the dependent variable was equal to one for establishments taken over by a US firm and 
otherwise zero. There is no evidence that US firms are more likely to take over establishments that 
are more IT intensive, or that establishments are increasing their IT intensity (see Appendix Table 
A4 for full results)25. 
 
IV. A Simple Theoretical Model of IT and Productivity 
 
In this section, we consider a formal model that potentially can rationalize the macro stylized facts 
with the results we see in the micro-econometric analysis. We have established that foreign 
affiliates of US firms appear more productive than affiliates of other multinationals and that this 
productivity advantage appears to be linked strongly to their use of IT, suggesting an unobserved 
complementary input that is more abundant in US firms. The literature suggests that one candidate 
for this complementary input may be the internal organization of US firms. In this section, we 
build a model in which firms optimally are choosing their organizational form. We show how the 
predictions from the simple dynamic model are consistent with what we have observed in the 
micro (and macro) data. First (in sub-section IV.A), we present some survey data to corroborate 
the idea that US firms have distinctive organizational features. Then (in sub-section IV.B), we 
                                                          
24 Taken literally, the negative coefficient on the US linear term in column (4) implies a negative US effect for firms 
with IT capital below approximatively £4,500 ($9,000). Only 0.1% of employment in US establishments is below this 
threshold.    
25 For example, the marginal effect of (lagged) IT capital in the US takeover equation was 0.0029 with a standard error 
of 0.0095 (we included controls for size, non-IT intensity, productivity, age and industry dummies – none of which 
were significant). 
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sketch the basic model and finally (in sub-section IV.C) we show how some extensions of the 
model fit other features of the data. 
 
We base this theory on the costs of making organizational changes, as this seems to be consistent 
with a range of information from case studies and other papers. We readily concede that this is not 
the only model that could rationalize some of the facts (see sub-section V.B below). However, we 
think that it is a compelling model fitting the general facts in our empirical study as well as the 
more general literature. We offer some direct evidence on the model using explicit measures of 
labor market regulation in sub-section IV.D. 
 
A. The Organization of US firms 
Before we present the model it is worth considering some supporting evidence on the different 
internal organization of US versus European firms. In Figure 3, panels 3a and 3b provide new 
evidence we collected on the internal organization of over 700 firms in the US and Europe. These 
show that, on average, firms operating in the US are significantly more decentralized than those 
operating in Europe.26 This is also true when looking at US multinationals in Europe compared to 
non-US multinationals in Europe, with the US firms again being significantly more decentralized.  
In Panels 3c and 3d we use two other UK surveys, the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey and 
the Community Innovation Survey, to show that US multinationals also had a higher rate of 
change in organizational structure going back to the mid-1980s. So, in short, US firms are 
organized differently, both at home and abroad, and also change organizational structures more 
swiftly. 
 
B. Basic Model 
Consider two representative firms, one in the US and one in the EU. To keep things as simple as 
possible we assume that technology, prices, and all parameters (except organizational adjustment 
costs) are common in the two regions. Firms in the US and EU are always optimizing - i.e. 
European firms are not making systematic “mistakes” by choosing a different organizational form, 
                                                          
26 Decentralization was measured in the same way as Timothy Bresnahan et al (2002) using questions related to task 
allocation and pace setting in order to indicate the degree of employee autonomy. 
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but rather are reacting optimally, given the common economic environment and their different 
adjustment costs.  
 
The firms produce output (Q) by combining IT (C) inputs, non-IT capital inputs (K) and labor 
inputs (L), with all other inputs assumed to be zero for simplicity, and defined as follows: 
 
Q = A Cα+σO Kβ -σO L1-α-β 
 
Organizational structure is denoted O and is normalized on a scale from zero, from “centralized” 
production, to one, as modern “decentralized” production27. The α, β and σ are production function 
parameters where 0 < α + β < 1 and 0 < σ < β.28 This specification of the production function is a 
simple way of capturing the notion that IT and organizational form are complementary as σ > 0. 
Second, we have modelled O as having only adjustment costs. There is no “price” of a level of 
organizational capital, nor is there always a positive marginal product of output with respect to O. 
This implies that the optimal organizational form will depend on the relative prices of the factor 
inputs and technology. In earlier time periods the higher relative price of IT meant that firms were 
more intensive in non-IT capital (K), which gave no incentive to maintain positive levels of O. 
 
The firm sells its output in a market with iso-elastic demand elasticity e ( >1) so that P = BQ-1/e 
where P is the output price and B is a demand shock parameter.  Combining the production with 
this demand function we can write revenue as:  
 
PQ = Z(Cα+σO Kβ -σO L1-α-β) 1 - 1/e 
 
 
                                                          
27 We choose centralization/decentralization based on some of the case study evidence concerning the introduction of 
IT, but to some extent this is just labelling. What matters is that the optimal organizational form changes with IT and 
that there are costs associated with making this change. The new form of organization will be different in different 
industries, centralized in some, decentralized in others. 
28 For simplicity, we have not allowed O to enter into the exponent of L. Nothing fundamental would change by 
allowing this – what matters is the strength of the positive interaction between ln(C) and O is stronger than it is with 
the other two factors.  
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where Z = BA1-1/e is an arbitrary constant (since A and B are arbitrary scaling constants). Defining  
ψ = α(1 - 1/e), µ= β(1 - 1/e), γ = (1-α- β)(1 - 1/e) and λ = σ(1 - 1/e), we combine the production 
function parameters and the demand parameters to re-write revenue as:  
 
γλµλψ LKCPQ OO −+=  
Flow profits then can be defined as: 
 
KCWLOgLKC KCOO ρργλµλψ −−−∆−=Π −+ )(  
 
where W is the wage rate, ρC is the rental cost of IT capital and ρK is the rental cost of non-IT 
physical capital, g(∆O) is the adjustment cost function and ∆ is the first difference operator 
(e.g. tO∆ = Ot - Ot-1). The rental costs of IT and non-IT capital are calculated using the Hall-
Jorgenson formula, ( )]1/[ 1 −−+= + xtxtxxtxt pprp δρ  where x = {C, K}, r is the discount rate, Ctp and 
K
tp are the prices of IT and non-IT capital respectively, and δ
C and δK are the depreciation rates of 
IT and non-IT capital respectively. 
 
As appears to be the case in the data (e.g. Dale Jorgensen, 2001) we assume that the cost of IT 
investment goods, Ctp  was falling at 15% per year until 1995 and at 25% per year after 1995. Non-
IT capital prices and wage rates, in comparison, have been relatively more stable and, for 
simplicity in the model, are assumed to be constant. 
 
We assume that the organizational adjustment cost term g(∆O) has a quadratic component and a 
fixed disruption component and is borne as a financial cost. Our critical assumption is that the 
quadratic component is higher in Europe. We show some econometric evidence below that this 
may reflect tougher labor laws making it expensive to rapidly hire and fire workers in any 
organizational change. The fixed component of adjustment costs reflects the business disruption 
from any organizational change29.  
                                                          
29 We assume this to be common in Europe and the US for modelling simplicity – allowing this to be higher in the EU 
would tend to reinforce the qualitative results reported below. 
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g(∆O) = ωm(∆O)2 + ηPQ| ∆O≠0|          where m = {EU,US} and   ωEU > ωUS 
 
Firms maximize their present discounted value of profits. Introducing explicit time sub-scripts and 
given the structure of the problem, we can write the deterministic value function for a firm as: 
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Applying standard results from Nancy Stokey, Robert Lucas and Edward Prescott (1988) it can be 
shown that this value function is continuous, strictly decreasing in Ctρ and has an almost 
everywhere unique solution in Ct, Kt, Lt and Ot. Given any initial conditions for C0ρ and O0, the 
policy correspondence functions can be used iteratively to solve the time path of Ct, K t, Lt and Ot . 
 
The long-run qualitative features are reasonably obvious. As the price of IT continues to fall, the 
steady state optimal organizational form is complete decentralization for all firms (O equal to 
unity). The interesting question, however, is the transitional dynamics and whether this differs 
between the US and Europe. Although the model has a well-behaved analytical solution, in order 
to derive numerical values for any particular set of parameter values we need to use numerical 
methods. 
 
To do this we define the parameter values as follows: α = 0.025 reflecting a 2.5% revenue share 
for IT; β = 0.3 reflecting a 30% share for non-IT capital in value added; and e = 3 reflecting a 50% 
mark-up over marginal costs; MC, ((P-MC)/MC = 1/(1-e)). The parameter λ has no obvious value, 
so we set this at λ = ψ so that full “decentralization” (moving from O equal zero to O equal unity) 
doubles the value of the marginal product of IT and reduces the value of the marginal product of 
capital by just under 10%. Picking larger or smaller values of λ while holding the scaling on O, 
constantly increases or reduces the degree of complementarity between O and λ. The discount rate 
is set at r = 10%, the IT depreciation rate at δC = 30% (Basu et al, 2003), the non-IT depreciation 
rate of δK = 10% and the wage rate is normalized to unity (W = 1). The fixed costs of adjustment 
are set at η = 0.2 percent of sales selected on the evidence for the fixed costs of capital investments 
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(see Nick Bloom, 2006); given the lack of any direct evidence on the cost of organizational 
adjustment costs. The quadratic adjustment cost parameter is set so that adjustment costs are four 
times as high in Europe as in the US (i.e. ωEU/ ωUS = 4), roughly similar to the differences in the 
OECD’s labor regulation indices in Giuseppe Nicoletti, Stefano Scarpetta and Olivier Boyland 
(2000). The starting values for Cp0  and O0 are taken as 
Cp0  = 0.066 and O0 = 0 in 1975, with the 
price process then exponentially decaying (as outlined above) until 2025 at which point prices stop 
falling any further, while Kp is normalized to unity. The first and last ten years of the simulation 
are then discarded to abstract from any initial and terminal restrictions30.  
 
The model has several intuitive predictions that are consistent with the stylized facts and also 
contains some novel predictions. First, we trace out the decentralization decisions of firms in 
Figure 4. We see that US firms start to decentralize first (in the late 1980s) and are on average 
more decentralized than European firms throughout the period under consideration (the 
representative EU firm begins to decentralize about nineteen years after the American firm). The 
US decentralizes first because of its lower adjustment costs31.  
 
Figure 5 examines the IT capital-labor ratio in logarithms (ln(C/L)). Unsurprisingly, this is rising 
in both regional blocs due to the global fall in IT prices. IT intensity grows at an identical rate in 
the two regions, until the US starts to decentralize and at this point American firms start to become 
more IT intensive than European firms. This is because of the complementarity underlying the 
production function (higher O implies higher optimal IT investment). Labor productivity (Q/L) is 
shown in Figure 6. The higher IT intensity translates through into higher labor productivity which 
accelerates from the mid 1990s.  
 
These findings are consistent with the broad macro facts as discussed earlier. We now discuss 
extensions to fit the micro data results. 
                                                          
30 The code is written in MATLAB available on request from the authors and on http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/ 
31 The fixed costs of adjustment implies that firms always change O in discrete “chunks” and the cost of making any 
given jump will always be greater for European firms because of their higher quadratic adjustment costs. 
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C.  Extensions to the basic model 
Multinationals - We now consider multinational companies who operate several establishments, at 
least one of which is on foreign soil. We extend the modelling framework to consider an additional 
cost in maintaining different organizational forms in different establishments. Multinationals 
appear to operate globally similar management and organizational structures (e.g. Christopher 
Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal, 1999) as this makes it much easier to integrate senior managers, 
human resource systems, software, etc. At different ends of the skills spectrum both McKinsey and 
McDonalds are recognizably similar in Cambridge, Massachusetts and Cambridge, England. To 
formalize this we allow an additional quadratic adjustment cost which has to be born if there is a 
difference between the organization of the establishment i (Oi) and its parent ( PARENTO ), 
i
PARENT
i PQOO )()(
2−φ . 
 
Consider the case of a US firm purchasing a European establishment (in the period after US firms 
have started to decentralize). The purchased establishment will start to become more decentralized 
than identical establishments owned by domestic firms (or European multinationals operating 
solely in Europe). It will also start increasing IT intensity and labor productivity at a faster rate 
than European owned establishments. The degree to which the establishment resembles its 
American parent will depend on the size of φ  relative to the adjustment cost differential ωEU/ωUS. 
The larger is φ  the more quickly the establishment will start to resemble its US parent32. Note that 
the presence of adjustment costs, however, suggests that this change will not be immediate so after 
an American firm takes over a European establishment the IT intensity and productivity will be, 
for some periods, below that of longer-established US affiliates. 
 
The middle line in Figure 7 shows the simulation results for a hypothetical British establishment 
taken over by a US multinational in 2003. The calibration assumes φ =1. Under this scenario, the 
taken over firm initially converges to within 0.1 point of the organizational structure of the US 
parent company five years after the take over year. 
                                                          
32 This raises questions about the reasons for takeovers. Why should a US firm ever take over a European plant if it 
has to bear greater adjustment costs than a European multinational? One reason is that the US parent may have higher 
TFP from some firm-specific advantage that it can diffuse to the affiliate (such as better technology or management).  
This is not modelled here for parsimony, but could easily be included. 
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The model now matches the qualitative features of the data. When US firms take over European 
establishments we observe an increase in labor productivity and a higher coefficient on IT in the 
production function that accounts for all of the US establishments’ productivity differential. 
Furthermore, this process does not happen immediately as there are adjustment costs – this is what 
we observed in the dynamic specifications when looking at takeovers (the last two columns of 
Table 5)33. 
 
Industry Heterogeneity - The fall in the price of IT has opened up the possibility of IT-enabled 
innovations to a greater extent in some industries than others. George Baker and Thomas Hubbard 
(2004) for example describe how on-board computers have altered business methods in the 
trucking industry. In our model we can capture this by allowing a different degree of 
complementarity between IT and organization in some industries than others (i.e. a higher σ). 
Those sectors that we have labelled (following Kevin Stiroh, 2002) “IT intensive” would have a 
higher σ and therefore follow the patterns analyzed above. Other sectors with low σ would not 
follow these patterns and for these industries US and EU productivity experience should be similar 
as both regions enjoy the benefits of faster productivity growth. This is what we find in the micro 
data – the differences between US and EU firms are much stronger in the sectors than intensively 
use IT. 
 
Permanent Differences in Organizational/Management Quality - An alternative model to the one 
we have presented could be one were US firms have always been better managed/organized than 
European firms and that this better management is complementary with IT. This could be due to 
tougher competition, culture, less family run firms, etc. Under this model “O” would enter as an 
additional factor input in the production function with an exogenously lower price in the US than 
in Europe. For example, 
 
Q = A OχCα+σO Kβ -σO L1-α-β-χ 
                                                          
33 An alternative model close to that of Andrew Atkeson and Patrick Kehoe (2006) would be to consider 
organizational capital based on learning about IT. If the US started learning first (again, possibly because of lower 
adjustment costs) and organizational capital can be transferred across countries within the multinational this would 
also generate the results we see in the data. 
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This set-up would rationalize most of the findings presented in the paper except one – that the 
linear US multinational dummy was insignificantly different from zero once we have accounted 
for the higher coefficient on IT capital for US firms (see Table 3 column (3) and Table 5 column 
(4)). Thus, we conclude that the results on grounds of parsimony and consistency imply σ > 0 and 
χ = 0.  
 
Adjustment Costs for IT capital and TFP measurement - For simplicity we abstracted away from 
adjustment costs in IT capital and other factors of production. Consider a simple extension of the 
model where we also have quadratic adjustment costs in IT capital, but assume that these are the 
same across countries. The implications of such a model are discussed formally in Appendix B. 
Obviously this will slow down the change in IT and organization, O, but the qualitative findings 
from the theory discussed above will still go through34. One difference, however, is that under this 
model measured TFP will appear to grow as IT is accumulated, even though actual TFP growth is 
stable. Under the baseline model the share of IT capital in revenue is still equal to Oλψ +  in every 
period so the “weight” on IT capital in the conventionally measured TFP formula will be correct. 
Once we allow for adjustment costs in IT, by contrast, the empirical share of IT in revenues will be 
below its steady state level. This will mean that measured TFP will exceed actual TFP (A). The 
prediction from this extension to the basic model is that a regression of measured TFP growth on 
IT capital growth will generate a positive coefficient on IT. We calculated measured TFP growth 
as a residual using factor shares as weights and regressed this on the growth of IT capital stock, 
ownership dummies, a multi-plant dummy, age and year dummies. The IT capital stock coefficient 
was 0.0056 with a standard error of 0.0023. As with Erik Brynjolfsson and Lorin Hitt (2003), the 
coefficient on IT rose as we considered longer differenced specifications (e.g. it was 0.0105 for the 
400 establishments where we could construct four year differences, approximately equal to the 
share of IT in total revenues). So this is consistent with the extension to the model. 
 
The model with IT adjustment costs also predicts that during the initial period when the US is 
adjusting its organizations and rapidly accumulating IT, the correlation of measured TFP growth 
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and IT capital growth will be stronger for US firms than EU firms. In our TFP regressions 
including an additional US interaction with IT growth was positive, but never significant at the 5% 
level. This lack of significance may be because IT adjustment costs are also higher in the EU than 
the US. If this is the case the “wedge” between production function parameters and IT factor share 
could be larger in Europe, with the coefficient on the US interaction becoming ambiguous (see 
Appendix B for more theoretical details).  
 
D. A little “direct evidence” on the model 
The attraction of our model is that it assumes fully rational behavior by firms, it is parsimonious 
and it is able to match a range of the micro and macro stylized facts discussed in the paper.35 There 
are other models that may also be able to do the same, however. So in this sub-section we consider 
some more direct evidence that measures of institutional inflexibility that generate differential 
adjustment costs (like labor market regulations) might be a key difference. 
 
Christopher Gust and Jaime Marquez (2004) show that an employment protection index is 
negatively correlated with country-wide IT expenditure as a share of GDP for thirteen OECD 
countries. Our model suggests that these regulations are partially “exported” to the multinational’s 
establishments in the UK (through the desire to keep a globally similar organization within the 
multinational). To examine this idea we match in the World Bank’s measure of the flexibility of 
labor regulation to the establishments in our dataset by country of ownership, which is shown in 
Figure 8. So, for example, the Germany data point plots the labor regulation index in Germany 
against the IT intensity for establishments owned by German multinationals. We find that the IT 
intensity of multinational affiliates is higher in the UK when labor market flexibility is greater in 
their home country (the correlation coefficient between IT intensity and labor market flexibility is 
0.0579 and is significant at the 1% level)36. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
34 For an analysis of mixed fixed and quadratic adjustment costs with two factors see Nick Bloom, Steven Bond and 
John Van Reenen (2006) or Nick Bloom (2006). 
35 Gustavo Crespi, Chiara Criscuolo and Jonathan Haskel (2006) and Laura Abramovsky and Rachel Griffith (2007) 
present some other evidence related to our organization-based model 
36 When we drop all the observations from US multinationals the correlation coefficient is 0.0351 (significant at the 
10% level). 
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More ambitiously, Table 6 presents regressions based on the multinational-only sample where we 
include interactions with labor market regulation of the multinational’s home country and the 
establishment’s IT capital. The first column includes only the standard production function 
controls (i.e. it drops the ownership variables) and includes the index of the flexibility of labor 
regulation. The coefficient on the flexibility index is positive and significant suggesting higher 
TFP for multinationals whose home country has more flexible labor markets. The next column 
repeats the baseline specification of column (1) in Table 4 and shows that the standard results hold 
on this sample. In particular, the interaction between the US dummy and IT capital is significantly 
positive. In column (3) we include instead the interaction between labor regulation (in the 
multinational’s home country) and IT. The coefficient on this interaction is also significantly 
positive, consistent with the theory: lighter regulations in the establishment’s home country appear 
to be associated with greater productivity of IT in the UK. We repeat the specifications of columns 
(2) and (3) including fixed effects in columns (4) and (5) and show the robustness of the results. 
Ideally, we would like to show that the US interaction is driven to insignificance by on the 
interaction of IT with the labor regulation index. This is not the case; in column (6) when we 
include both interactions these are positive but individually insignificant37.  
 
Overall we take these results as supportive of our basic model. It appears to be the flexibility of the 
US economy in adapting to the challenges of major changes (such as the IT revolution) that gives 
it productivity advantage, not its permanent superiority in all states of the world.  
 
V. Conclusions 
 
Using a large and original establishment level panel dataset we find robust evidence that IT has a 
positive and significant correlation with productivity even after controlling for many factors, 
including establishment fixed effects. Our most novel result, however, is that we can account for 
the US multinational advantage in productivity by the higher productivity of their IT capital. 
Furthermore, the stronger association of IT with productivity for US firms is confined to the same 
“IT using intensive” industries that largely accounted for the US “productivity miracle” since the 
mid 1990s. These results were robust to examining establishments that were taken over by other 
                                                          
37 The interactions are jointly significant at the 10% level. 
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firms: US firms who took over establishments have significantly greater IT productivity relative to 
non-US multinationals who took over statistically similar establishments.  
 
US firms appear to obtain significantly higher productivity from their IT capital than other 
multinational establishments (and domestic establishments), even in the context of a UK 
environment. This suggests that part of the IT-related productivity gains underlying the recent US 
“productivity miracle” may be related to US firm characteristics rather than simply the natural 
advantage (geographical, institutional or otherwise) of being located in the US environment. We 
rationalized the macro and micro stylized facts with a simple model that combines the importance 
of internal organization and environmental factors. Firms in the US and Europe optimally choose 
their organization and factor inputs like IT with identical production functions and face the same 
rapid falls in IT prices. The lower adjustment costs for US firms (possibly due to more flexible 
labor regulations) allows them to re-organize more swiftly to take advantage of the new IT enabled 
innovations. Coupled with the idea that multinationals face costs of maintaining different 
organizational forms in different countries this model delivers predictions consistent with our 
results.  
 
There are many outstanding issues and research questions. First, according to our model the US is 
not always superior. Rather, it is the flexibility of the US economy in adapting to major changes 
(such as the IT revolution) that gives it a temporary productivity advantage. This model predicts 
that Europe will start to realize enhanced IT-enabled productivity growth over the next few years 
and resume the catching up process with the US that was observed until the mid 1990s. There may 
be some evidence of this occurring as Europe’s productivity growth in 2006 picked up as 
America’s slowed slightly38. Of course, if the world economy has moved into a stage of 
development where technology-related turbulence is inherently greater, then the more flexible US 
will retain an edge over Europe for the foreseeable future. 
 
Second, we would like to confront our model more directly with measures of organization and IT. 
This paper has looked at the consequences of organizational change on “standard” observables 
                                                          
38 The Economist, April 14th 2007, Economic Focus “Making Less With More” 
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(although IT is also rarely observed at the micro level). A follow-up study to Nick Bloom and John 
Van Reenen (2006) has collected data from several thousand firms on internal organization 
structure, management and IT across eleven countries. We can use this data to directly examine 
some of the model’s implications. 
 
Thirdly, we would like to understand the determinants of decentralization and other organizational 
design features of firms in much more detail. What are the other factors determining how and 
when firms change their structure? Daron Acemoglu et al (2006) make a start in this direction. 
 
Despite this need for further research we believe our paper has made some inroads into one of the 
most puzzling episodes in the last decade: the explanation of the US “productivity miracle”.
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APPENDIX A: DATA AND ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
 
A1 ESTABLISHMENT DATASET: THE ANNUAL BUSINESS INQUIRY 
The Annual Business Inquiry (ABI) is the major source of establishment level data in the UK. It underlies the 
construction of aggregate output and investment in the national accounts and is conducted by the Office of National 
Statistics (ONS) the UK equivalent of the US Census Bureau. The ABI is similar in structure and content to the US 
Longitudinal Research Database except that it covers non-manufacturing as well as manufacturing. The recently 
constructed US Longitudinal Business Database covers non-manufacturing but it does not have output or investment – 
items that are necessary to estimate production functions. 
 
The ABI is a stratified random sample: sampling probabilities are higher for large establishments (e.g. 100% for all 
establishments with more than 250 employees). Each establishment has a unique “reporting unit reference number” 
(RUREF) which does not change when an establishment is taken over by a new firm. Data on the production sector 
(including manufacturing) is in the ABI which has a long time series element (from 1980 and before in some cases). 
Data on the non-production sector (services) is available for a much shorter time period (from 1997 onwards). The 
sample is large: in 1998 there are 28,765 plants in the production sector alone. 
 
The questionnaire sent out on the ABI is extensive and covers all the variables needed to estimate basic production 
functions. The response rates to the ABI are high because it is illegal not to return the forms to the Office of National 
Statistics. The ABI includes data on gross output, value added, employment, the wage bill, investment and “total 
materials” (this includes all intermediate inputs – energy, materials, etc.). Value added is constructed as the sum of 
turnover, variation of total stocks, work of capital nature by own staff, insurance claims received minus purchases. 
The construction of the IT and non-IT capital stocks are described in the next section. We condition on a sample that 
has positive values of all the factor inputs, so we drop establishments that have zero IT capital stocks. 
 
A2 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DATASETS 
Working closely with statisticians and data collectors at ONS we combined five major IT surveys and matched this 
into the ABI establishment data using the common establishment code (RUREF). The main IT surveys include the 
Business Survey into Capitalized Items (BSCI), the Quarterly Inquiry into Capital Expenditure (QICE) and the Fixed 
Asset Register (FAR). We used information on hardware from the BSCI, QICE and FAR in the main part of the paper, 
one survey of computer use by workers (the E-Commerce Survey) and one software survey (ABI supplement). Of 
these, only the software survey was designed to cover exactly the same establishments as contained in the ABI survey, 
but because there is over-sampling of the larger establishments in all surveys the overlap is substantial, especially for 
the larger establishments. These surveys are compiled at the reporting unit level, and contain information on the value 
(in thousands of pounds) of software and hardware acquisitions and disposals. Once the stocks are built within each 
different survey, we combine them across surveys and, for hardware and software separately, we build across-surveys 
stocks.39  In the following paragraphs we first describe the different surveys; we then illustrate the details of the 
Perpetual Inventory Method used for the construction of the capital stocks and the procedure followed to build across-
surveys variables. 
 
A2.1 Data Sources 
Business Survey into Capitalized Items (BSCI). The BSCI asks for detail of acquisitions and disposals of capital in 
more than 100 categories, including computer hardware and software. The survey is annual and runs between 1998 
and 2003; we dropped the 1998 cross section due to concerns over reliability expressed by the data collectors. There is 
a 100% sampling frame for businesses with more than 750 employees and a stratified random sample of businesses 
with between 100 and 750 workers. The BSCI contributes about 1,500 to 2,000 observations for each year between 
1999 and 2003. We use the SIC92 code 30020 defined as “Computers and other information processing equipment”. 
Notes to this category specify “Microcomputers, printers, terminals, optical and magnetic readers (including operating 
systems and software bundled with microcomputer purchase).” 
 
                                                          
39 We are careful to check for differences in coefficients due to the IT measures coming from different surveys. We 
could not reject the assumption that there were no significant differences in the IT coefficients arising from the fact 
that the IT stocks were built from different surveys. 
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Quarterly Inquiry into Capital Expenditure (QICE). The QICE provides information on hardware and software 
investments from 2000Q1 until 2003Q4. The inquiry selects 32,000 establishments each quarter. Of these 32,000 
companies, all establishments with over 300 employees are selected each quarter. Businesses with fewer employees 
are selected for the inquiry randomly. Each quarter one fifth of the random sample is rotated out of the sample and a 
new fifth is rotated in. The quarterly data have been annualized in several alternative ways and we checked the 
robustness of the results across these methods. First, we extrapolated within year for establishments with missing 
quarters40. As a second alternative, we constructed an indicator that gives the number of non-missing values that exist 
for each year and establishment and included this as an additional control in the regressions. Third, we dropped 
observations constructed from less than four full quarters. The results were robust across all three methods and the 
tables report results based on the first method.  
 
Fixed Asset Register (FAR). The FAR asks for the historic cost (gross book value) of the fixed assets held on the 
firms’ asset register, broken down by the years of acquisition. The survey provides information on IT hardware assets 
only, and covers the years 1995 up to 2000. The survey provides information for about 1,000 hardware observations.  
E-Commerce Survey. The E-Commerce Survey was conducted in 2001, 2002 and 2003 with around 2,500 
establishments in each cross section. Unfortunately these were random cross-sections so the overlap between years is 
minimal (preventing us from performing serious panel data analysis). Plant managers were directly asked “What 
proportion of your employees uses a computer, workstation or terminal”. To construct an estimate of the number of 
employees using IT we multiplied this proportion by the number of workers in the establishment. Although this is 
conceptually much cruder than the IT capital stock, it has the advantage that we do not have to rely so much on 
assumptions concerning the initial conditions. In Table 4 we discuss the results from this measure, showing very 
similar results to those obtained from using the IT capital measure. 
Software questions in the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). The ABI contains a question on software expenditures from 
2000 onwards. There are approximately 20,000 non-zero returned values for software investments in each year. We 
had some concerns about the accuracy of the establishment reports of software expenditure41 so we focus in the main 
part of the paper on the IT hardware stocks. 
 
A2.2 Estimation of IT capital stocks 
We build stocks of IT capital applying the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) to the IT investment data (and the non-
IT investment data) described above. The basic PIM equation is: ( ) hithhithit KIK 11 −−+= δ                                                                           
where htI  represents real investment of asset type h (e.g. computer hardware,
C
tI ) and 
h
tδ  is the asset specific 
depreciation rate. To construct real investment we deflate nominal investments using the economy-wide (asset 
specific) hedonic price indices for software and hardware provided by the National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research (which are based on Jorgensen’s US price deflators). We rebased to the year 2000 for consistency with the 
other PPI deflators (see below).  
 
Zeros 
Both the BSCI and the QICE code missing values as zeros. While in the BSCI we are able to identify actual zero 
investments through a specific coding, for the QICE this is not possible. In the construction of the capital stocks we 
treated the zero investments observations as actual absence of IT investments. In the regressions we drop observations 
with zero IT capital stocks 
 
Interpolations 
In order to maximize the number of observations over which we could apply the PIM, we interpolated net investment 
observations for a single year of data if we observed investment the year before and the year afterwards. This affected 
only 2.8% of the observations in the regression sample and results are robust to dropping these observations. 
 
Initial Conditions 
                                                          
40 The extrapolation was done by simple averaging, but we also tried more sophisticated quarterly models taking into 
account the quarter surveyed. This made practically no difference. 
41 For example, many software values are imputed and the coding for the imputation does not make it clear how the 
imputation took place and for which establishments. 
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In order to apply the PIM methodology, we need to approximate a starting value to start the recursion. We apply a 
similar methodology as the one devised by Martin (2005) to construct establishment level capital stocks in the ARD. 
For each firm, we first build two digit industry-specific  IT Investment/Capital ratios using the NISEC02 industry 
level data-set provided by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, which contains separate time-series 
data on IT capital stocks and runs up to 2001 (these are based on the input-output tables starting in 1975). We then use 
the ratio of the establishment’s IT investment flow to the industry investment flow to impute the IT capital stock (i.e. 
we are assuming that the establishment’s share of the IT capital stock in the industry is equal to the establishment’s 
share of IT investment in the industry in the initial year). More precisely, we assume that for t = 0 only the initial 
establishment level IT capital stock 0iC  is:       )C / ( 0 jiIIC jt
C
jt
C
iti ∈∀=  where j represents an industry so a j sub-
script represents an industry total – i.e. CjtI  is total industry IT investment and jtC  is the total IT capital stock in time 
t. We apply this approximation to determine our initial condition in the first year that the establishment appears in our 
sample. For greenfield sites this is not an issue as their capital stock is zero. After the first year, we simply apply the 
Perpetual Inventory Method.  
 
Some of the establishments that we observe only for the first time may be investing systematically at a different rate 
from the industry average. To check whether our results were driven by the methodology used to build the initial 
conditions, we considered an alternative methodology based on employment weights to calculate the starting value, 
*
0iC  : ( ) Citjtjtiti ICLLC +−= −−− δ1)/( 111*0 . So this is assuming that the establishment’s share of the industry IT 
stock in the initial period is equal to the establishment’s lagged share of employment.  
 
Depreciation 
For all IT capital we chose a depreciation rate of 36%. This choice is consistent with the analysis by methodology 
followed by the BEA which, in turn, derives from the study by Doms, Dunn, Oliner and Sichel (2004). In this study, 
the depreciation rate for PCs is estimated at approximately 50%, this value including both obsolescence and 
revaluation effects. Since – as the BEA - we use real IT investments we have to use a lower depreciation rate to avoid 
double counting of the revaluation effect, included in the price deflators.  Basu et al (2003) argue that the true 
geometric rate of depreciation should be, in fact, approximately 30%. The significance and the magnitude of the 
coefficient obtained for IT capital is not affected by the exact choice of the alternative depreciation rate.  
 
Across-Survey Stocks 
Following the steps described above, we obtain hardware and software stocks within each different survey. We then 
matched our constructed IT dataset with the ABI sample. In order to simplify the empirical analysis, we combined all 
the information of the different the surveys constructing overall across-surveys IT stocks for both hardware and 
software. Our strategy is to use the BSCI measure as the most reliable observation (as recommended by the data 
collectors). We then build our synthetic measure using the QICE stocks if the BSCI observation is missing or equal to 
zero and the QICE is different from zero. We finally use the FAR if both QICE and BSCI are missing and/or equal to 
zero and the FAR is not.  
 
In order to keep track of the possible measurement error introduced using this procedure, we introduce in all the IT 
regressions a dummy that identifies the provenience of the observation for both the hardware and the software stocks. 
These dummies and their interactions with the IT coefficients are not significantly different from zero. A small portion 
of the firms included in our dataset responded to more than one survey. We use some of this overlapping sample to get 
a better understanding of the measurement error in the data. By comparing the reports from the same establishments 
we calculate that there is much more measurement error for software than for hardware, which is one reason why we 
currently focus on hardware. We did not find any evidence that the measurement error for IT capital was different for 
US firms than other firms. 
 
A3 DEFINITION OF I.T. INTENSIVE USING INDUSTRIES  
We focus on “IT intensive” sectors that are defined to be those that use IT intensively and are not producers of 
information or communication technologies. The definitions of IT usage and IT producers are based on O’Mahony 
and Van Ark (2003) who base their definitions on Kevin Stiroh (2002). They use US data to calculate the capital 
service flows and define IT use intensity as the ratio of IT capital services to total capital services. IT intensive using 
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sectors are those where (a) the industries has above median IT capital service flows to total capital service flows and 
(b) the industry is not an IT producing industry.  All industries are based on ISIC Revision 3.  
 
A4 CLEANING 
We used standard procedures to clean the ABI and the IT data. First, we dropped all observations with negative value 
added and/or capital stock. Secondly we dropped the top and bottom percentile of the distribution of the growth of 
employment and gross value added. Thirdly, we dropped extreme values of total capital stock per employee and gross 
value added per employee. This step of the cleaning procedure was performed on the overall ABI sample. We applied 
a similar cleaning procedure also to our across surveys IT variables. We dropped the top and bottom percentiles of the 
ratio of the IT capital (and expenditure) relative to gross value added42.  
 
A5 DEFINITION OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND UK MULTINATIONALS 
The country of ownership of a foreign firm operating in the UK is provided in the ABI and is based on information 
from Dun and Bradstreet’s Global “Who Owns Whom" database. Dun and Bradstreet define the nationality of an 
establishment by the country of residence of the global ultimate parent, i.e. the topmost company of a world-wide 
hierarchical relationship identified “bottom-to-top” using any company which owns more than 50% of the control 
(voting stock, ownership shares) of another business entity.  UK Multinationals are identified via the matching of the 
ABI with the Annual Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI) register made by Criscuolo and Martin (2004). The AFDI 
identifies the population of UK firms which are engaging in or receiving foreign direct investment (FDI)43. Each 
establishment in the ABI that is owned by a firm which appears in the AFDI register can consequently be defined as a 
multinational. UK multinationals are thus UK-owned firms which appear in the AFDI. 
 
A6 TAKEOVERS 
The identification of takeovers consists of three basic steps. First, for all the available years (1980-2003 for 
manufacturing and 1997-2003 for services) we use all the raw ABI data (including “non-selected” establishments 
where we know employment but not output or capital). We thus create a register file that allows us to keep track of the 
whole history of each firm, and exploit the uniqueness of the reporting unit reference number (RUREF) to correct for 
obvious reporting problems (i.e. establishments that disappear in one year, and appear again after some time). Second, 
for each establishment we keep track of changes in the foreign ownership information and the enterprise group 
reference number (this is a collection of RUREFs owned by a single group) to identify foreign and domestic 
takeovers44. Third, to control for measurement error in the takeover identification, we drop from the sample some 
ambiguous establishment observations: (a) establishments that are subject to more than three takeovers during their 
history; (b) for the establishments with two or three takeovers, we dropped observations where a time period could be 
simultaneously as “pre” and “post” takeover. We use up to three years prior to the takeovers in the “pre-takeover” 
regressions and up to three years after the takeover in the “post takeover” regressions. The year when the takeover 
occurred is dropped because it is unclear when in the year the establishment switched. 
 
A7 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Panel A of Table A2 gives some descriptive statistics for our key variables. Note that median employment in the 
establishment is 238 which are larger than the ABI median because the IT surveys tend to focus on the larger 
establishments. Average IT stock is just over £1m ($2m) and value added per worker is just under £40,000 ($80,000). 
Labor accounts for 31% of revenues and materials 58% on average. IT capital is estimated at 1% of revenues (non-IT 
capital is 10%).   
 
Panel B of Table A3 breaks down mean values of the IT capital - output ratio and ln(IT capital) by ownership type and 
whether or not the sector is IT intensive. Unsurprisingly, across all establishments the IT capital-output ratio is much 
                                                          
42 The results of the regression are qualitatively similar if the IT data are cleaned using the ratio of investments per 
employee or stocks per employee.   
43 The working definition of Foreign Direct Investment for this purpose is that the investment must give the investing 
firm a significant amount of control over the recipient firm. The ONS considers this to be the case if the investment 
gives the investor a share of at least ten per cent of the recipient firm's capital. 
44 Foreign takeovers are observed if a firm experiences a change in the foreign ownership marker. Domestic takeovers 
are observed if a UK firm changes its enterprise reference number. See Griffith et al (2004) for more details on the 
methodology. 
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higher in the IT intensive industries compared to other sectors (3% compared to 2%). More interestingly, US 
multinationals have a higher IT capital-output ratio than non-US multinationals only in the IT intensive sectors (4% 
compared to 3%). In the other sectors US and non-US multinationals have a similar IT-output ratio (3% in each). The 
levels of IT capital show much higher values for US establishments than non-US multinationals (especially in the IT 
intensive sectors).  
 
A8 ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
Table A3 contains alternative econometric estimates of the production function allowing for endogenous factor inputs.  
First, in column (1) we present results using the Blundell- Bond (1998) system GMM estimator. We have to restrict 
the sample to firms where we have at least four continuous years of information on all variables which, given our short 
time series and sampling frame, severely reduces the sample size (this is also the reason why we use all sectors, not 
just the IT intensive sectors). Even on this sub-sample we are still able to identify a significant interaction effect 
between IT capital and the US dummy variable.  The coefficient on IT for US firms is significantly different from the 
IT coefficient on non-US firms at the 10% level. The structural model of firm behaviour underlying the Olley-Pakes 
(1996) approach is not consistent with simply including interactions, so instead we estimate the production function 
separately for the three ownership types separately: US multinationals in column (2), non-US multinationals in 
column (3) and UK domestic firms in column (4). The IT coefficient is twice as large for US multinationals as it is for 
non-US multinationals, which is consistent with our earlier findings. The standard errors are also large, however, due 
to the smaller sample size, so we are not able to reject the null that the coefficients are the same. 
 
Table A4 estimates takeover regressions as a function of lagged covariates. The sample is of those establishments who 
were at some point taken over by another firm. In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is equal to one if the 
establishment was taken over by a US multinational and zero otherwise (i.e. if it was taken over by a non-US multi-
national or a domestic UK firm). In columns (3) and (4) we drop the takeovers by UK domestic firms so that the 
dependent variable is equal to one if the establishment was taken over by a US multinational and zero otherwise (i.e. if 
it was taken over by a non-US multinational). Columns (1) and (3) examine whether more IT intensive establishments 
were more likely to be taken over by a US multinational. Columns (2) and (4) examine whether establishments which 
were growing more IT intensive were more likely to be taken over by a US multinational. There seems to be no 
significant correlation between lagged IT levels or growth and the probability of being taken over by a US firm. 
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APPENDIX B: TFP DYNAMICS AND ADJUSTMENT COSTS FOR IT CAPITAL 
 
In this Appendix we consider the extension to the model where we allow adjustment costs in IT capital and discuss the 
implied dynamics of measured TFP.  Note that all the main implications from the basic model go through in terms of 
the implications for labor productivity so we do not repeat these again. In particular, the production function is the 
same so we expect a larger coefficient on IT for US firms in the production function. The difference in the theory 
predictions when allowing for IT adjustment costs lies in the analysis of measured TFP growth. 
  
B1. MODEL BASICS  
Figure B1 shows there are five distinct regimes defined by how organizations are changing. The exact years will differ 
from the baseline model because IT adjustment costs slow down adjustment, but the qualitative features remain the 
same. In Regimes 1 and 5 neither the EU nor the US is adjusting O, so that O = 0 in the earliest regime (1) and O = 1 
in the last regime (5). The interesting changes are the three "transition" regimes (2 through 4). In Regime 2 US firms 
are adjusting their organizations EU firms are not. In Regime 3 both EU and US are adjusting and in Regime 4 only 
the EU is adjusting. 
 
If we consider the growth of the IT stock (∆c, noting that c = log(C)) this will depend on the target level of c and on 
the adjustment costs in c, which we now assume to be twice-differentiable, minimized at zero and convex (for 
example quadratic). EU growth of c will be slower as growth of O is slower. As a result in Regime 2 US ∆c will be 
faster. In Regimes 3 and 4 US ∆c will initially be faster, but at some point there will be a "crossing point" when ∆c is 
equal between the US and the EU. In Regime 5 EU ∆c will be faster as it catches up with the US.  
 
B2. TFP MEASUREMENT  
We can defined the change in measured TFP (∆TFPM) as 
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where αx is the elasticity of revenue with respect to factor x, sx is the share of factor x in revenues, Y is revenue (PQ) 
and a∆  is actual TFP growth. So using the results of Section IV αc = ψ + λO, αk= µ - λO and αl = γ (we are ignoring 
time subscripts). Measured TFP will differ from actual TFP if the shares are different from the revenue function 
"coefficients". In all our models we assume that actual TFP growth is zero ( a∆ = 0). In the basic model with only 
organizational adjustment costs ∆TFPM = 0 as all revenue function coefficients equal their factor shares (e.g. αc = sc). 
If we introduce IT adjustment costs into the model this equality still holds for non-IT capital and labor as they have no 
adjustment costs. But for IT the factor share will not longer equal the revenue function coefficient. Furthermore, since 
in the model IT is always rising as an input share, actual levels of IT will always be below the target levels of IT, so 
that αc > sc. Thus, with the addition of IT adjustment costs we obtain the “wedge” between actual and measured TFP: 
 
c)(TFP cc
M ∆−=∆ sα                                                          (B2) 
 
We can characterize the magnitude of the bias if we place more structure on the problem.45 Assume IT adjustment 
costs take the form G(Ct,Ct-1) = θCCt-1(Ct/Ct-1 - 1)², i.e. standard homogeneous quadratic adjustment costs ignoring 
depreciation. Then C is also a state variable, so that the Bellman equation is 
 
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
++∆−−
=
+ ),O,V(C1
1)O()1C/C(C -
K-WL-C -),KL,O,Y(C
 ),O,V(C
C
1ttt
2
t
2
 1-tt 1-t
t
K
tt
C
ttttt
K,L,O,C
C
t1-t1-t max
tttt ρωθ
ρρ
ρ
rmC
      (B3) 
                                                          
45 For simplicity we abstract away from the fixed adjustment costs for O. 
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The first order condition for C is: 
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Now if C is always increasing then αcYt/Ct - ρCt > 0, i.e. the instantaneous returns to C are positive as the firm has too 
little C from a current state perspective. Rearranging equation (B4) thus implies: 
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The right hand side of equation (B5) is positive and gives the magnitude of the "wedge" between the production 
function parameters and the observed factor shares. The size of the wedge will determine the observed TFP growth.  
 
B3. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS  
We can now derive a set of empirical implications for TFP dynamics. We consider a time-series regression46 of 
measured TFP growth on the change in all factor inputs, but in particular on IT capital growth. 
 
(1) In all periods the coefficient on the change in labor and capital will be zero. In all periods we will obtain a positive 
coefficient on the growth of the IT stock, ∆c, from equation (B2). 
 
(2) The size of the coefficient on ∆c will vary by ownership type over time. First, consider the early period (Regime 1) 
before either the US or EU started adjusting O, during which time the gap between actual and desired IT will be equal 
for the EU and the US. Consequently the interaction with IT growth and ownership in the TFP regression will be zero. 
Next, consider the initial period of adjustment in O by the US firms (Regime 2) when US firms begin adjusting O 
upwards and European firms are not changing O. Over this period the "wedge" between αc and the observed factors 
share, sc, will be higher for US firms (∆c is higher), so that their IT coefficient in the measured TFP equation will be 
higher than the European coefficient. Thirdly, consider the final period of adjustment (Regime 5) when the US has 
completely changed organizational form (O = 1) while Europe is still changing. Over this period European firms will 
be increasing their IT stocks faster than US firms, so that now the EU wedge, and therefore EU coefficient on ∆c in 
equation (B2), will be higher. In the middle periods (Regimes 3 and 4) the prediction is ambiguous as the size of the 
wedge depends on the growth of the IT stock and level of ∂V/∂C, which could be higher or lower in the EU. 
 
(3) Finally, relax the assumption that the adjustment costs in IT capital are the same in the US and EU. Imagine that 
these adjustment costs are higher in the EU47 (our baseline model assumed that organizational adjustment costs were 
higher in the EU but everything else was the same). In this case the relationship between US "wedge" ( USC
US
C s−α ) 
and the EU "wedge" ( EUC
EU
C s−α ) will be ambiguous. The US will be adjusting its level of IT faster than the EU (at 
least until the start of Regime 3) implying a larger US wedge between actual and desired IT input shares. But the EU 
will have higher adjustment costs for any given change of IT implying a higher EU wedge. Which effect dominates 
will depend on the relative magnitudes of the IT and organizational adjustment costs and the period of adjustment. 
Hence, allowing for asymmetric IT and organizational adjustment costs makes the coefficient on the interaction of IT 
and ownership in the TFP regression ambiguous even in Regime 2. This may be the reason why the interaction of ∆c 
and US ownership in the TFP growth equation is insignificant (although positive) in our data. 
 
 
                                                          
46 By "time series regression" we mean data generated from observations of "representative" EU and US firms (or the economy-
wide aggregates). In the actual data we use there will also be some idiosyncratic shocks causing heterogeneity around these 
averages that we are not considering for now. 
47 We can think of the non-organizational adjustment costs for IT as things like the absolute change in firm size (holding 
organizational structure constant), the physical adjustment of buildings and equipment, and the resale of loss of old-IT etc. 
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TABLE 1 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BROKEN DOWN BY MULTINATIONAL STATUS 
(Normalized to 100 for the three digit industry-year average) 
  Employment Value 
added per 
Employee 
Gross 
output 
per 
Employee 
Non IT 
Capital 
per 
Employee 
Materials 
per 
Employee 
IT 
Capital 
per 
Employee 
US 
Multinationals        
 Mean 162.26 127.96 123.63 129.61 123.81 152.13 
 St. Deviation 297.58 163.17 104.81 133.91 123.35 234.41 
 Observations 569 569 569 569 569 569 
        
Other 
Multinationals  
      
 Mean 148.58 113.71 115.22 120.65 116.02 119.58 
 St. Deviation 246.35 107.87 86.50 126.83 107.63 180.34 
 Observations 2,119 2,119 2,119 2,119 2,119 2,119 
        
UK domestic        
 Mean 68.78 89.86 89.69 86.33 89.29 83.95 
 St. Deviation 137.72 104.50 102.09 127.16 129.37 188.30 
 Observations 4,433 4,433 4,433 4,433 4,433 4,433 
 
Notes: These are 2001 values from our sample of 7,121 establishments.  
 
TABLE 2 – DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES 
 
Labor Productivity in establishments owned by US multinationals and by non-US multinationals 
 High IT intensity 
Establishments 
Low IT intensity 
Establishments 
Diff 
US Multinationals 3.893 3.557 0.336*** 
 (0.742) (0.698) (0.043) 
 1,076 729  
    
Other Multinationals 3.711 3.473 0.238*** 
 (0.756) (0.664) (0.022) 
 4,014 2,827  
    
Diff  0.182*** 0.084**  
 (0.036) (0.037)  
Diff in Diffs   0.098** 
   (0.048) 
 
Notes: Productivity is measured as ln(Value Added per Employee). “High IT intensity establishments” are 
observations where the ratio of IT capital to employment (demeaned by the three-digit industry and year average) is 
greater than the median. 8,646 Observations; only multinationals considered. Standard errors are clustered by 
establishment. 
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Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of gross output. The time period is 1995-2003. The 
estimation method in all columns is OLS. Columns (6) to (8) include establishment level fixed effects. Standard errors in brackets under coefficients in all columns are clustered by 
establishment (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form). All columns include a full set of three digit industry dummies interacted with a full set of time 
dummies and as additional controls: dummies for establishment age (interacted with a manufacturing dummy), region, multi-establishment group (interacted with ownership type) 
and IT survey. See Appendix Table A1 for definition of IT using intensive sectors. “Test  USA*ln(C)=MNE*ln(C)” is test of whether the coefficient on USA*ln(C) is significantly 
different from the coefficient on MNE*ln(C), etc. 
TABLE 3 – ESTIMATES OF THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION ALLOWING THE I.T. COEFFICIENT TO DIFFER BY OWNERSHIP STATUS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: ln(Output) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) 
Sectors All Sectors All Sectors All Sectors 
IT Using 
Intensive 
Sectors 
Other Sectors All Sectors 
IT  Using 
Intensive 
Sectors 
Other Sectors 
Fixed effects NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
USA*ln(C) - - 0.0086* 0.0196** 0.0033 0.0049 0.0278*** -0.0085 
USA ownership*IT capital   (0.0048) (0.0078) (0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0105) (0.0071) 
MNE*ln(C) - - 0.0001 -0.0030 0.0037 0.0042 0.0055 0.0034 
Non-US multinational *IT capital   (0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0034) (0.0052) (0.0044) 
Ln(C) - 0.0457*** 0.0449*** 0.0399*** 0.0472*** 0.0146*** 0.0114** 0.0150*** 
IT capital  (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0047) (0.0034) 
Ln(M) 0.5575*** 0.5474*** 0.5475*** 0.6212*** 0.5065*** 0.4032*** 0.5020*** 0.3605*** 
Materials (0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0142) (0.0104) (0.0178) (0.0280) (0.0209) 
Ln(K) 0.1388*** 0.1268*** 0.1268*** 0.1108*** 0.1458*** 0.0902*** 0.1064*** 0.0664*** 
Non-IT Capital (0.0071) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0094) (0.0092) (0.0159) (0.0229) (0.0209) 
Ln(L) 0.2985*** 0.2690*** 0.2688*** 0.2179*** 0.2869*** 0.2917*** 0.2475*** 0.3108*** 
Labor (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0102) (0.0076) (0.0173) (0.0326) (0.0195) 
USA 0.0712*** 0.0642*** 0.0151 -0.0824* 0.0641* -0.0110 -0.1355* 0.0472 
USA Ownership (0.0140) (0.0135) (0.0277) (0.0438) (0.0354) (0.0424) (0.0768) (0.0405) 
MNE 0.0392*** 0.0339*** 0.0338** 0.0325 0.0194 -0.0162 -0.0160 -0.0204 
Non-US multinational (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0161) (0.0241) (0.0214) (0.0198) (0.0327) (0.0254) 
Observations 21,746 21,746 21,746 7,784 13,962 21,746 7,784 13,962 
         
Test  USA*ln(C)=MNE*ln(C), p-value  - 0.0944 0.0048 0.9614 0.9208 0.0403 0.1340 
Test  USA=MNE,  p-value 0.0206 0.0203 0.5198 0.0108 0.2296 0.9072 0.1227 0.9665 
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TABLE 4 – ROBUSTNESS TESTS OF THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Experiment Baseline 
Specification 
Value 
Added 
All Inputs 
Interacted 
with US 
and MNE 
Alternative 
IT measure 
Full 
“Translog” 
interactions 
% USA  in 
4 digit 
industry  
Wages as a 
proxy for 
skills 
EU and 
Non EU 
MNEs 
Dependent var:  ln(Output) ln(Q) ln(VA) ln(Q) ln(Q) Ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) 
         
USA*ln(C) 0.0278*** 0.0604** 0.0328** 0.0711** 0.0268*** 0.0270** 0.0208** 0.0283*** 
USA ownership*IT capital (0.0105) (0.0245) (0.0141) (0.0294) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0096) (0.0105) 
MNE*ln(C) 0.0055 -0.0070 0.0002 0.0056 0.0028 0.0050 0.0021 - 
Non-US multinational*IT capital (0.0052) (0.0142) (0.0065) (0.0131) (0.0050) (0.0054) (0.0047)  
Ln(C) 0.0114** 0.0263** 0.0126** 0.0285*** 0.0327 0.0090* -0.0227 0.0114** 
IT capital (0.0047) (0.0106) (0.0050) (0.0083) (0.0463) (0.0048) (0.0163) (0.0047) 
Ln(M) 0.5020*** - 0.4925*** 0.6390*** 0.2779 0.5017*** 0.4455*** 0.5023*** 
Materials (0.0280)  (0.0312) (0.0195) (0.2225) (0.0279) (0.0296) (0.0278) 
Ln(K) 0.1064*** 0.2157*** 0.1075*** 0.1390*** 0.2686** 0.1070*** 0.0767*** 0.1063*** 
Non-IT Capital (0.0229) (0.0546) (0.0228) (0.0170) (0.1255) (0.0230) (0.0216) (0.0229) 
Ln(L) 0.2475*** 0.4835*** 0.2530*** 0.2171*** 0.3002 0.2472*** 0.3958*** 0.2472*** 
Labor (0.0326) (0.0571) (0.0343) (0.0140) (0.2095) (0.0329) (0.0361) (0.0325) 
USA  -0.1355* -0.3552** -0.2734 -0.0125 -0.1419** -0.1323* -0.0967 -0.1374* 
USA Ownership (0.0768) (0.1492) (0.2578) (0.1113) (0.0683) (0.0763) (0.0739) (0.0769) 
MNE -0.0160 0.0733 -0.0489 -0.0087 -0.0112 -0.0148 -0.0010 - 
Non-US multinational (0.0327) (0.0855) (0.1687) (0.0758) (0.0322) (0.0334) (0.0309)  
USA*ln(M) - - 0.0335 - - - - - 
USA ownership*materials   (0.0376)      
MNE*ln(M) - - 0.0080 - - - - - 
Non-US multinational *materials   (0.0235)      
USA*ln(K) - - 0.0242 - - - - - 
USA ownership*Non IT capital   (0.0368)      
MNE*ln(K) - - -0.0142 - - - - - 
Non-US multinational *Non IT capital   (0.0134)      
USA*ln(L) - - -0.0767 - - - - - 
USA ownership*Employment   (0.0497)      
MNE*ln(L) - - 0.0193 - - - - - 
Non-US multinational *Employment   (0.0239)      
USA_IND - - - - - 0.9194 - - 
[% of US Multinationals in industry]      (2.3378)   
USA_IND*ln(C) - - - - - 0.3607 - - 
[% of US Multinationals in 
industry]*IT capital 
     (0.4119)   
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ln(Wage) - - - - - - 0.2137*** - 
Average wage       (0.0407)  
ln(Wage)*ln(C) - - - - - - 0.0109* - 
Average Wage*IT capital       (0.0056)  
EU MNE - - - - - - - -0.0328 
EU ownership        (0.0354) 
NON-EU MNE - - - - - - - -0.0066 
Non EU-NON USA Ownership        (0.0910) 
EU MNE*ln(C) - - - - - - - 0.0065 
EU ownership*IT Capital        (0.0051) 
NON EU MNE*ln(C) - - - - - - - -0.0079 
Non EU-NON USA Ownership*IT 
capital 
       (0.0158) 
Observations 7,784 7,784 7,784 2,196 7,784 7,784 7,780 7,784 
Test  USA*ln(C)=MNE*ln(C), p-value 0.0403 0.0122 0.0224 0.0122 0.0244 0.0288 0.0575 - 
Test  USA=MNE, p-value 0.1227 0.007 0.3618 0.007 0.0602 0.1288 0.1982 - 
Test on joint significance of all the 
interaction terms, excluding IT 
interactions (p-value) - - 0.3288 - - - - - 
Test on joint significance of all the US 
interaction terms, excluding IT (p-
value} - - 0.4837 - - - - - 
Test on all the other MNE's  
interaction terms, excluding IT (p-
value) - - 0.3838 - - - - - 
Test on additional “translog” terms, p-
value - - - - 0.0000 - - - 
Test  USA=EU, p-value - - - - - - - 0.2072 
Test  USA=NON EU, p-value - - - - - - - 0.2500 
Test  USA*ln(C)=EU*ln(C), p-value - - - - - - - 0.0457 
Test  USA*ln(C)=NON EU*ln(C), p-
value - - - - - - - 0.0511 
 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all columns is the log of gross output. All columns are for the sectors that use IT 
intensively only.  The time period is 1995-2003. The estimation method in all columns is OLS. All columns except (4) include establishment level fixed effects. Standard errors in 
brackets under coefficients in all columns are clustered by establishment (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form). All columns include a full set of 
three digit industry dummies interacted with a full set of time dummies and as additional controls: dummies for establishment age (interacted with a manufacturing dummy), region, 
multi-establishment group (interacted with ownership type) and IT survey (except column (4)). The IT measure in column (4) is the log(number of people using computers). We also 
include interactions of the US dummy (and the MNE dummy) with ln(labor) in this column.  Column (5) includes all the pair-wise interactions of materials, labor, IT capital, and 
non-IT capital and the square of each of these factors. Column (6) includes the percentage of non-US multinationals in the establishment’s four digit industry. “Test 
USA*ln(C)=MNE*ln(C)” is test of whether the coefficient on USA*ln(C) is significantly different from the coefficient on MNE*ln(C), etc.
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TABLE 5 - PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS BEFORE AND AFTER TAKEOVERS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample Before takeover 
Before 
takeover 
After 
takeover 
After 
takeover 
After 
takeover 
After 
takeover 
(drop UK  
domestic 
acquirers) 
Dependent Variable: ln(Output) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) 
USA*ln(C) - -0.0322 - 0.0224** - - 
USA Takeover*IT capital  (0.0277)  (0.0102)   
MNE*ln(C) - -0.0159 - 0.0031 - - 
 
Non-US multinational Takeover*IT capital 
 (0.0118)  (0.0079)   
USA  -0.0031 0.1634 0.0827*** -0.0345 - - 
USA Takeover 
 
(0.0335) (0.1357) (0.0227) (0.0550)   
MNE -0.0221 0.0572 0.0539*** 0.0412 - - 
Non-US multinational Takeover (0.0226) (0.0598) (0.0188) (0.0380)   
USA*ln(C) one year  - - - - 0.0095 -0.0103 
after takeover     (0.0149) (0.0176) 
USA*ln(C) two and  - - - - 0.0274** 0.0315* 
three years after  takeover     (0.0115) (0.0170) 
MNE*ln(C)  one year  - - - - 0.0003 - 
After  takeover     (0.0109)  
MNE*ln(C) two and  - - - - 0.0041 - 
three years after  takeover     (0.0085)  
Ln(C) 0.0582*** 0.0593*** 0.0495*** 0.0460*** 0.0459*** 0.0806*** 
IT capital (0.0092) (0.0097) (0.0061) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0169) 
Ln(M) 0.4949*** 0.4950*** 0.5276*** 0.5286*** 0.5287*** 0.5913*** 
Materials (0.0308) (0.0306) (0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0448) 
Ln(K) 0.1592*** 0.1591*** 0.1145*** 0.1145*** 0.1142*** 0.0311 
Non-IT Capital (0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0333) 
Ln(L) 0.2723*** 0.2727*** 0.2927*** 0.2918*** 0.2924*** 0.2480*** 
Labor (0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0367) 
USA one year  - - - - 0.0591 0.0466 
after  takeover     (0.0720) (0.1007) 
USA two and three - - - - -0.0713 -0.1507 
years after  takeover     (0.0641) (0.0951) 
MNE one year  - - - - 0.0230 - 
after takeover     (0.0534)  
MNE two and three - - - - 0.0489 - 
Years after takeover     (0.0418)  
Observations 1,422 1,422 3,466 3,466 3,466 692 
       
Test USA*ln(C) = MNE*ln(C), p-value - 0.5564 - 0.0880 - - 
Test USA = MNE, p-value 0.5900 0.4430 0.2216 0.2104 - - 
Test USA one year = MNE one year, p-value - - - - 0.6743 - 
Test USA two plus years =  
MNE two plus years, p-value 
- - - - 0.0894 - 
Test  (USA one year)*ln(C) =  - - - -  - 
(MNE one year)*ln(C), p-value     0.6044  
Test (USA two plus years)*ln(C) =  - - - -  - 
(MNE two plus years)*ln(C), p-value     0.0691  
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The sample is of all establishments who were 
taken over at some point (the omitted base is “domestic takeovers” - UK firms taking over other UK firms). The dependent 
variable in all columns is the log of gross output. The time period is 1995-2003. The estimation method is OLS. Standard 
errors in brackets under coefficients are clustered by establishment. A takeover is defined as a change in the establishment 
foreign ownership marker or - for UK domestic establishment - as a change in the enterprise group marker.  The "before" 
period is defined as the interval between one and three years before the takeover takes place.  The "after" period is defined 
as the interval between one and three years after the takeover takes place. The year in which the takeover takes place is 
excluded from the sample. All columns include a full set of three digit industry dummies interacted with time trends and as 
additional controls: age, region dummies, a multi-establishment group dummy and an IT survey dummy. “Test 
USA*ln(C)=MNE*ln(C)” is test of whether the coefficient on USA*ln(C) is significantly different from the coefficient on 
MNE*ln(C) , etc. 
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TABLE 6 - IT AND LABOR MARKET REGULATION 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Sample All  MNE's All  MNE's All MNE's All MNE's All MNE's All MNE's 
Dependent Variable ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) 
USA*ln(C) - 0.0230*** - 0.0287* - 0.0161 
USA ownership*IT capital  (0.0081)  (0.0161)  (0.0154) 
USA   -0.1186*** - -0.1483 - -0.1600 
USA Ownership  (0.0453)  (0.0988)  (0.1058) 
Labor Regulation*ln( C ) - - 0.0439** - 0.0702** 0.0295 
World Bank Labor Regulation Index*IT 
capital 
  (0.0193)  (0.0358) (0.0332) 
Labor Regulation 0.0968** - -0.1410 - -0.3651 -0.0666 
World Bank Labor Regulation  Index  (0.0434)  (0.0998)  (0.2700) (0.2451) 
Ln(C) 0.0488*** 0.0439*** 0.0134 0.0152** -0.0339 -0.0041 
IT capital (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0158) (0.0073) (0.0270) (0.0254) 
Ln(M) 0.6347*** 0.6354*** 0.6352*** 0.5353*** 0.5375*** 0.5063*** 
Materials (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0340) (0.0351) (0.0296) 
Ln(K) 0.0995*** 0.0972*** 0.0987*** 0.0733* 0.0738* 0.0923** 
Non-IT Capital (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0402) (0.0409) (0.0395) 
Ln(L) 0.2046*** 0.2062*** 0.2042*** 0.2529*** 0.2514*** 0.2457*** 
Labor (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0486) (0.0485) (0.0396) 
Observations 3,144 3,144 3,144 3,144 3,144 3,144 
 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all columns is the 
log of gross output. The time period is 1995-2003. The estimation method in all columns is OLS. The sample includes 
only multinationals. Columns (4), (5) and (6) include establishment level fixed effects. The labor regulation index is 
based on the “Rigidity of Employment” index, drawn from the World Bank “Doing Business” report. The index is 
transformed so that higher values imply more flexible systems. The transformation applied is y = (1-x) (so 0=inflexible, 
1=most flexible). All columns include a full set of three digit industry dummies interacted with a full set of time 
dummies and as additional controls: dummies for establishment age (interacted with a manufacturing dummy), region, 
multi-establishment group (interacted with ownership type) and IT survey. Standard errors in brackets under 
coefficients in all columns are clustered by establishment (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of 
unknown form). The sample is IT using intensive sectors only. See Appendix A1 for definition of IT using intensive 
sectors.  
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TABLE A1 – BREAKDOWN OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECTORS BY IT USAGE 
 
IT Intensive Sectors 
 
Manufacturing Services 
18 Wearing apparel, dressing and dying of fur 51 Wholesale trades 
22 Printing and publishing 52 Retail trade 
29 Machinery and equipment 71 Renting of machinery and equipment 
31 Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Apparatus 
n.e.c. excludes 313 (insulated wire) 
73 Research and development 
33 Precision and optical instruments, excluding 331 
(scientific instruments) 
 
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats  
353 Aircraft and spacecraft  
352+359 Railroad equipment and transport equipment  
36-37 miscellaneous manufacturing and recycling  
 
Other Sectors 
 
Manufacturing IT 
producing 
sector? 
Services IT 
producing 
sector? 
15-16 Food drink and tobacco No 50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor 
vehicles 
No 
17 Textiles No 55 Hotels and catering No 
19 Leather and footwear No 60 Inland transport No 
20 Wood No 61 Water transport No 
21 Pulp and paper No 62 Air transport No 
23 Mineral oil refining, coke and nuclear No 63 Supporting transport services, travel 
agencies 
No 
24 Chemicals No 64 Communications Yes 
25 Rubber and plastics No 70 Real estate No 
26 Non-metallic mineral products No 72 Computer services and related activity Yes 
27 Basic metals No 741-743 Professional business services No 
28 Fabricated metal products  No 749 Other business activities n.e.c. No 
30 Office machinery Yes   
313 Insulated wire Yes Other sectors  
321 Electronic valves and tubes Yes 10-14 Mining and quarrying No 
322 Telecom equipment Yes 50-41 Utilities No 
323 Radio and TV receivers Yes 45 Construction No 
331 Scientific instruments Yes   
34 Motor vehicles    
 
Notes: See text for definitions. IT intensive sectors are those that have above median IT capital flows as a proportion of 
total capital flows and are not IT producing sectors. 
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TABLE A2 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Panel A: All Establishments 
Variable Frequency Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Employment 7,121 811.10 238.00 4,052.77 
Gross Output 7,121 87,966.38 20,916.48 456,896.10 
Value Added 7,121 29,787.61 7,052.00 167,798.70 
IT Capital 7,121 1,030.60 77.44 10,820.69 
ln(IT Capital) 7,121 4.46 4.35 2.03 
Value Added per worker 7,121 40.43 29.53 55.19 
Gross Output per worker 7,121 124.74 86.03 136.55 
Materials per worker 7,121 82.38 47.23 103.52 
Non-IT Capital per worker 7,121 85.28 48.56 112.54 
IT Capital per worker 7,121 0.96 0.34 2.08 
IT expenditure per worker 7,121 0.41 0.14 0.89 
Material costs as a share of revenues 7,121 0.57 0.60 0.23 
Employment costs  as a share of revenues  7,121 0.83 0.64 0.86 
Non-IT Capital as  a share of revenues  7,121 0.30 0.26 0.20 
IT Capital  as  a share of revenues 7,121 0.010 0.004 0.018 
Age 7,121 8.38 5.00 6.74 
Multigroup dummy (i.e. is establishment part of larger 
group?) 7,121 0.53 1.00 0.50 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Breakdown by Ownership Status and Sector 
  IT Capital over gross output  (C/Q)             Ln(IT Capital) 
  
All 
sectors 
IT Using 
Intensive 
Sectors 
Other 
Sectors 
All 
sectors 
IT Using 
Intensive 
Sectors 
Other 
Sectors 
All firms Mean 0.03 0.03 0.02 4.46 4.78 4.27 
 St. Deviation 0.04 0.04 0.04 2.03 2.06 1.99 
 Observations 7,121 2,703 4,418 7,121 2,703 4,418 
        
US Multinationals Mean 0.04 0.04 0.03 5.57 5.69 5.46 
 St. Deviation 0.05 0.05 0.04 2.00 1.94 2.05 
 Observations 569 260 309 569 260 309 
        
Other Multinationals  Mean 0.03 0.03 0.03 5.18 5.34 5.07 
 St. Deviation 0.04 0.04 0.04 1.96 1.99 1.93 
 Observations 2,119 853 1,266 2,119 853 1,266 
        
UK domestic Mean 0.02 0.03 0.02 3.98 4.33 3.79 
 St. Deviation 0.04 0.04 0.03 1.91 1.99 1.83 
  Observations 4,433 1,590 2,843 4,433 1,590 2,843 
 
Notes: All monetary amounts are in sterling in year 2001 prices. Total stocks are constructed as described in the 
Appendix. All variables in units of 1,000s except ratios and employment. 
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TABLE A3 – GMM AND OLLEY PAKES RESULTS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample 
All 
establishments US multinationals 
Other 
multinationals 
Domestic UK 
establishments 
Estimation Method GMM Olley Pakes Olley Pakes Olley Pakes 
Sectors All sectors IT Using Intensive 
Sectors 
IT Using Intensive 
Sectors 
IT Using Intensive 
Sectors 
Dependent Variable Ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) ln(Q) 
     
USA*ln(C) 0.1176* - - - 
USA ownership*IT capital (0.0642)    
MNE*ln(C) 0.0092 - - - 
Non-US multinational *IT capital (0.0418)    
Ln(C) 0.0793*** 0.0758** 0.0343** 0.0468*** 
IT capital (0.0382) (0.0383) (0.0171) (0.0116) 
Ln(M) 0.4641*** 0.5874*** 0.6514*** 0.6293*** 
Materials (0.0560) (0.0312) (0.0187) (0.0267) 
Ln(K) 0.2052*** 0.0713 0.1017*** 0.1110*** 
Non-IT Capital (0.0532) (0.0674) (0.0285) (0.0270) 
Ln(L) 0.2264*** 0.1843*** 0.2046*** 0.2145*** 
Labor (0.0728) (0.0337) (0.0139) (0.0173) 
Observations 1,074 615 2,022 3,692 
First order serial correlation, p value 0.0100 - - - 
Second order serial correlation, p value 0.3480    
Sargan-Hansen, p-value 0.4570 - - - 
 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all columns is the 
log of gross output. The time period is 1995-2003. All variables are expressed in deviations from the year-specific three 
digit industry mean. Column (1) is estimated using System-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). One step GMM results 
reported. In column (1) instruments are all establishment level factor inputs lagged t-2 and before (when available) in 
the differenced equation (i.e. mt-2, lt-2 ,kt-2,ct-2, qt-2, USAt-2, MNEt-2, (USA*c)t-2, (MNE*c) t-2,qt-2,) and lagged differences in 
the levels equation (∆mt-1, ∆lt-1 , ∆kt-1, ∆ct-1, ∆USAt-1, ∆MNEt-1, ∆(USA*c)t-1, ∆(MNE*c)t-1,). Serial correlation tests are 
LM tests of the first differenced residuals (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). Sargan-Hansen Test of instrument validity is 
a test of the over-identification. “Test USA*ln(C)=MNE*ln(C)” is test of whether the coefficient on USA*ln(C) is 
significantly different from the coefficient on MNE*ln(C), etc. Columns (2)-(4) are estimated using Olley Pakes (1996). 
We use a fourth order series expansion to approximate the phi function. Standard errors in Olley-Pakes are bootstrapped 
(clustered at the establishment level) with 200 replications. All columns include age, region dummies and a dummy 
taking value one if the establishment belongs to a multi-firm enterprise group as additional controls.   
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TABLE A4 - NON RANDOM SELECTION OF US TAKEOVERS COMPARED TO OTHER TAKEOVERS? 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable = 1 if establishment taken over by 
US firm, = 0 for all other takeovers 
US 
Takeover=1 
US 
Takeover=1 
US 
Takeover=1 
US 
Takeover=1 
Sample All takeovers 
All 
takeovers 
All  except 
domestic 
takeovers 
All  except 
domestic 
takeovers 
     
ln(C/L)t-1 0.0029 - -0.0003 - 
 (0.0095)  (0.0365)  
∆ln(C)t-1 - -0.0236 - -0.0876 
  (0.0246)  (0.0714) 
ln(L)t-1 0.0140 0.0108 -0.0183 -0.0222 
 (0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0377) (0.0379) 
ln(K/L)t-1 0.0108 0.0109 -0.0174 -0.0346 
 (0.0209) (0.0204) (0.0645) (0.0650) 
ln(Q/L)t-1 0.0236 0.0270 0.0333 0.0580 
 (0.0269) (0.0263) (0.0860) (0.0843) 
Age -0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0003 -0.0014 
 (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0085) (0.0087) 
Observations 563 563 190 190 
     
 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in all columns is a 
dummy taking value 1 if the establishment is taken over by a US Multinational and zero otherwise. Takeovers by UK 
firms (“domestics”) are excluded in columns (3)-(4). The time period is 1995-2003. All columns include two digit 
industry dummies, region and year dummies. The estimation method in all columns is by a linear probability model. 
Standard errors in brackets under coefficients are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
 
 
Figure 1: Output per hour in Europe and the US, 1980-2005
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15” group are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
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Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and 
Netherlands. Labor productivity per hour worked in 
2005 US$. Source: The Conference Board and 
Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total 
Economy Database.
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Figure 2: IT capital per hour in Europe and the US, 1980-2005
Notes: IT capital stock (in unit dollars) per hour 
worked. IT capital stock measured using perpetual 
inventory method and common assumptions on 
hedonics and depreciation. 2005 US $ PPPs The 
countries included in the “EU 15” group are: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, UK, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the Netherlands. Labour productivity 
per hour worked in 2005 US$ using PPPs. Source: 
Marcel P. Timmer, Gerard Ypma and Bart van Ark, 
“IT in the European Union: Driving Productivity 
Convergence?”,  Research Memorandum GD-67, 
Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 
October 2003, Appendix Tables,  updated June 
2005.
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Figure 3a: Organizational devolvement,
firms by country of location
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Notes: In Figures 3a and 3b the “Organizational devolvement” score is the average score for the 2 organizational questions for 548 firms in the US (219), 
UK (98) and France and Germany (231). The questions are taken exactly from Bresnahan et al. (2002) covering “Task allocation” and “Pace setting” where 
a higher scores indicate greater worker autonomy. Full survey details in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). In Figure 3c the source is the WIRS data (1984 and 
1990) which plots the proportion of establishments experiencing organizational change in previous 3 years (all establishments in the UK). US MNEs 
(N=190), Non-US MNEs (N=147), Domestic (N=2848). Senior manager is asked “whether there has been any change in work organization not involving 
new plant/equipment in the past three years”. In Figure 3d the source is the CIS data: we plot the proportion of establishments experiencing organizational 
or managerial change in previous 3 years. The firm is asked “Did your enterprise make major changes in the following areas of business structure and 
practices during the three year period 1998-2001?” with answers to either “Advanced Management techniques” or “Major changes in organizational 
structure” recorded as an  organizational change. 
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European firms, model results
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Notes: Results from the numerical simulation of the theoretical model 1980-2015 (the full simulation was run 1970-2025). See text for details. 
Decentralization is the value of O (between 0 for full centralization and 1 for full decentralization).
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Figure 5: IT per unit of labor, log(C/L), in 
US and European firms, model results
Figure 6: Labor productivity, log(Q/L), in 
US and European firms, model results
US
Europe
Notes: Results from the numerical simulation of the theoretical model 1980-2015 (the full simulation was run 1970-2025). See text for details. 
Productivity is output per worker. Decentralization is the value of O (between 0 for full centralization and 1 for full decentralization).
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Figure 8: IT Intensity vs. Flexibility of Employment Index
Notes: The sample includes only establishments of multinationals in IT using sectors. Each point 
represents average IT intensity (IT capital divided by employment normalized by the three digit 
industry average) by country. Each country average is based on at least ten observations and three 
digit industries with fewer than 10 observations are excluded. The labour regulation index is the 
“Rigidity of Employment” index, drawn from the World Bank “Doing Business” report.
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Notes: This figure illustrates the theoretical predictions of the model when we allow for adjustment costs in IT (see Appendix B for details). 
Note that these are analytic results rather than numerically simulated so the years are approximate. The “wedge” is the difference between 
actual and measured TFP (see equation (B2)). Regime 1 is where neither the EU nor US have begun adjusting organization (so O = 0). 
Regime 5 is where both the EU and US have fully adjusted their organization (so O = 1). In Regime 2 the US has started adjusting, but the 
EU has not, in Regime 3 both regions are adjusting and in Region 4 the US has fully adjusted and the EU is still adjusting.
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